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HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a mortgage assistance relief scam perpetrated by Steve McMullen and 
Highland Financial, LLC (collectively referred to herein as "McMullen") upon Joseph Pierce 
("Pierce"). When Pierce found himself faced with the terrifying possibility oflosing his property 
located near Providence Lake in a foreclosure proceeding, he turned to McMullen for a solution. 
Unfortunately, McMullen was engaged in a consumer scam rather than a legitimate mortgage 
foreclosure relief consultation business. McMullen's real goal was to trick Pierce into signing 
title to his property over to McMullen for McMullen's financial benefit. Pierce filed a suit 
against McMullen for violation ofIdaho's Consumer Protection Act and breach of an implied-in-
law contract in relation to the scam. The trial court ruled that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
did not protect Pierce from the mortgage relief scam McMullen perpetrated on him. Pierce 
appeals this determination. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On December 14, 2009, Pierce filed a complaint against Respondents McMullen and 
Highland Financial alleging seven violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. R. pp. 4-6. 
Pierce also alleged a breach of an implied-in-Iaw contract. R. p. 6. Pierce was granted 
permission to serve Respondents via publication. R. p. 135. On August 3, 2010, Pierce sought 
an entry of default against both Respondents. R. 76. The court entered default against both 
Respondents on August 6, 2010. R. p. 135. 
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On April 25, 2011, an evidentiary hearing on damages was held. T. p. 7, L. 9. At the 
hearing, the trial court allowed Pierce to present evidence in support of his oral motion to amend 
the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. R. p. 135. The trial court found sufficient 
facts to warrant amendment of the complaint and granted Pierce's motion to amend to add a 
claim for punitive damages. The order allowing the amended complaint was entered on May 3, 
2011. R. p. 84. On May 11, 2011, Pierce filed his first amended complaint, which included all 
the previous averments and a claim for punitive damages. R. 86. 
On June 13, 2011, Steve McMullen entered his appearance on behalf of himself and 
Highland Financial, LLC. R. p. 93. On June 24, 2011, Pierce filed a notice of intent to take 
default against Highland Financial, LLC and McMullen pursuant to rd. R. Civ. P. 55(a)(l). R. p. 
96. On June 28, 2011, Respondent McMullen answered the amended complaint on his own 
behalf and on behalf of Highland Financial, LLC. R. p. 98. 
On September 28, 2011, a scheduling conference was held. Pierce's counsel was present. 
R. p. l35. Neither Respondent appeared. R. p. 135. A two day court trial was scheduled for 
June 18, 2012. R. p. l36. Pierce timely submitted his list of exhibits and witnesses pursuant to 
the court's pretrial scheduling order, but did not timely file the trial brief or proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. R. p. l36. McMullen filed nothing in compliance with the court's 
pretrial scheduling order. R. p. l36; T. p. 53, L. 11-14. 
On June 18, 2012, trial commenced. R. 136. Neither Respondent appeared. R. 137. 
Pierce moved the court for an order striking McMullen's answer. T. p. 53, L. 18. The court 
mled that judgment by default against McMullen was the appropriate sanction (T. p. 55, L. 2-4), 
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dismissed McMullen's answer (T. p. 55, L. 14), and entered default against Respondents. T. p. 
55, L. 16. The trial court fUliher ruled that Pierce prevailed on his claims. T. p. 55, L. 17 The 
trial cOUli then allowed Pierce to proceed to trial only on the issue of damages. T. p. 55, L. 18. 
After trial, the court ordered Pierce to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and a post-trial brief. T. p. 118, L. 8. Pierce submitted these pleadings as ordered. R. p. 104; 
112. 
On July 31, 2012, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dismissing Pierce's complaint and amended complaint on the 
basis that Pierce had failed to prove the allegations of his complaint. R. p. 134. On August 14, 
2012, Pierce filed a motion for a new trial pointing out that the trial court had represented that 
the trial would be limited to a determination of the amount of damages. Augmented Record, p. 
1. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Pierce's motion for a new trial on 
October 24,2012. R., p. 179. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2006, Pierce purchased land on Providence Lake in Bonner County, Idaho, (hereinafter 
"Providence Lake Property" or "the property"), which consisted of two 20 acre parcels. Tr. p. 58, 
L. 21; Tr. p. 59, L. 5. Pierce owed two mortgages of$143,000 and $116,000 respectively on the 
parcels. Tr. p. 59, L. 12-15. 
In 2007, Pierce experienced difficulty making the payments on the property. Tr. p. 58, L. 
17; Tr. p. 59, L. 18-20. Pierce signed an agreement with his lender postponing a scheduled 
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foreclosure, but allowed immediate foreclosure in the event Pierce missed any further payments. 
Tr. p. 42, L. 1-14. 
Steve McMullan, through his company Highland Financial, LLC, advertised and held 
himself out as being able to save property owners from foreclosure. Tr. p. 14, L. 6; R., p. 157. 
McMullen placed signs on the road advertising that the company bought homes and property and 
that his company could save property owners from losing their property in foreclosure. l Tr. p. 
14, L. 7-8; Tr. p. 16, L. 14-16; Tr. p. 58, L. 16. 
In response to Respondent's advertising, Pierce arranged to meet with McMullen to 
consult about avoiding foreclosure on the Providence Lake Property. Tr. p. 60, L. 7-10; Tr. p. 
60, L. 7; R., p. 152. McMullen assured Pierce that the company could help him financially, 
eliminate his debt, Tr. p. 91, L. 20, and save the property. Tr. p. 15, L. 12-20; Tr. p. 61, L. 24-
25; R., p. 152. McMullen represented to Pierce that McMullen would prevent the foreclosure by 
advancing the loan payments, and McMullen would then arrange to sell the property and split the 
profits from the sale with Pierce. Tr. p. 61, L. 24-25. McMullen represented orally to Pierce that 
Pierce would still have an interest in the property and would not lose the equity he had built. Tr. 
p. 16, L. 17-24; Tr. p. 63, L. 22-25; R., p. 158. 
On December 18, 2007, McMullen presented an approximate Y2 inch thick stack of 
papers to Pierce for his signature. Tr. p. 20, L. 24. Pierce asked McMullen to explain the 
I The company was engaging in "foreclosure rescue" at least since 2006 (Tr. 108, p. 14). In September, 2008, 
McMullen advertised on the company website that they were "real estate investment professionals (not real estate 
agents) who are dedicated to providing the best possible service." Tr. p. 43, L. 16; R. Evidentiary Rrg. Exh. I. 
McMullen advertised that they paid cash, and offered homeowners a "rent to own" program. R. Evidentiary Rrg., 
Exh.1. 
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documents. Tr. p. 69, L. 23-25. McMullen and his secretary were both talking to Pierce at the 
same time and handing him documents to sign. Tr. p. 20, L. 16-18. McMullen instructed Pierce 
"not to worry about it, they had partnered up, and he would take care of everything." Tr. p. 70, 
L. 1-3. Pierce understood from McMullen the documents were necessary to save the Providence 
Lake Property from foreclosure and protect Pierce's interests. Tr. p. 68, L. 21-24. 
One of the documents presented by McMullen was a trust agreement naming Pierce as 
the grantor and the beneficiary, and Heidi Russell as the trustee. The trust document was dated 
December 18,2007, but notarized on December 12,2007. Trial Exhibit 2. The corpus of the 
trust was the Providence Lake Property. Trial Exh. 2. Another document presented by 
McMullen for execution by Pierce was an assignment of trust dated and notarized December 18, 
2007, which assigned the beneficial interest in the trust to Highland Financial, LLC. Trial Exh. 
3. McMullen further included in the transaction package for Pierce's execution, a limited power 
of attorney that granted the trustee (Heidi Russell) authority to act on behalf of Pierce regarding 
the Providence Lake property. Trial Exh. 4. 
McMullen also had Pierce sign a "deed" that was titled "warranty deed" but referenced in 
the body of the document that it was a quitclaim deed. Trial Exhibit 5. The deed was dated 
December 18, 2007, and quit-claimed the Providence Lake Property from Pierce to the 
Providence Lake Trust. The deed stated it was for "estate planning purposes only." Trial 
Exhibit 5. 
Additionally, McMullen presented to Pierce a "Contract for Purchase and Sale" naming 
Pierce as the "seller" and Highland Financial LLC "and or assignees" as buyer of the Providence 
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Lake Property. Trial Exhibit 1. One of the terms of the contract was that the offer must be 
executed "by both parties on or before December 18,2007." Trial Exh. 1, p. 1, clause. IV. Pierce 
signed the document on December 18, 2007. The court found that McMullen signed the 
document on December 19. R. 156; Trial Exh. 1, p. 7.2 
Along with the above documents, the parties executed a promissory note in favor of 
Pierce from Steve McMullen in the amount of $30,000. The note was signed by Pierce on 
December 18, 2007, and signed by McMullen on December 19, 2007. Trial Exh. 6. Pierce's 
signature was notarized, but McMullen's was not. The promissory note provided that $30,000 
was to be paid to Pierce but would be reduced if there were any unpaid mortgages, taxes or 
Insurance. Trial Exh. 6. The promissory note bore no interest rate. Trial Exh. 6. Nine 
additional documents were presented by McMullen and signed by either Pierce or both Pierce 
and McMullen.3 
McMullen represented to Pierce that he would assume the loans for which Pierce was 
responsible, and market the propeliy for sale, along with Pierce.4 R. p. 157. McMullen told 
2 The substantive terms of the "contract for purchase and sale" document provided: 
(I)The purchase price was "not to exceed $329,000" (Trial Exh. 1, p. l,clause. II); (2) The purchase was subject to 
assumption of the existing Mortgage in favor of Summitt Inc ... having an approximate present principal balance of 
$294,000 (Trial Exh. 1, p. 1, Para. IJ(b)); (3) $30,000 was to be paid to Joseph Pierce "upon selling or refinancing 
the 40.4 acres" (Trial Exh. 1, Para. lIed)); (4) "balance after close" ... subject to adjustments and prorations was to be 
$20,000. Trial Exh. 1, Para. nee); (5) The "TOTAL" was not to exceed $324,000. Trial Exh. 1, p. 1 Para. II 
3 The additional documents were (1) Subject to and Equity Disclosure (Trial Exhibit 15); (2) Mold Disclosure and 
Release (Trial Exhibit 16); (3) Waiver ofInsurance Claim (Trial Exhibit 17); (4) Disclosure on Lead Based Paint 
and Hazards (Trial Exhibit 18); (5) Information About Your Property (Trial Exhibit 19); (6) Right to Cancel (Trial 
Exhibit 20); (7) Disclosure of Profession (Trial Exh. 21); (8) "No Guarantee or Promise" (Trial Exhibit 22); and (9) 
"Options you may Consider" (Trial Exhibit 14). 
4 Pierce had already engaged a realtor and had the property on the market when he met with McMullen listed for 
$650,000. Tr. p. 67 L. 23. McMullen was aware of this fact, and of the identity of the realtor. Tr. p. 92, L. 19. 
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Pierce that Pierce would retain an ownership interest in the property until it was sold. Tr. p. 61, 
L. 24; Tr. p. 91, L. 1; R. p. 158, para. 8. The default amount at the time the parties entered into 
the transaction was $20,000. Tr. p. 84, L. 18. Pierce remained the named borrower on the loans. 
Tr. p. 71, L 24. Respondent paid $11,000 toward the detault. Tr. p. 84, L. 12. 
Based upon McMullen's representations, Pierce believed when the property sold that he 
would receive $30,000, plus one-half the profit from the sale. Tr. p. 62, L. 22-25, p. 63, L. 1-5; 
Tr. p. 94, L. 23. McMullen represented to Pierce that Pierce had at least $111,000 in equity in 
the property based upon the assessed value. Tr. p. 66, L. 11-20; Trial Exh. 19; R. p. 158, para. 
10. Based upon McMullan's representations, Pierce believed he would, at a minimum, receive 
$55,000 in profit Tr. p. 95, L. 6, and the $30,000 down payment. Tr., p. 62, L. 12. 
Pierce had previously engaged a realtor to list the property for $650,000, and Pierce had 
interested buyers for the property. R. p. 158, paras. 9-10. Pierce was contacted by his realtor 
with a buyer who wanted to present a written offer on the property. Tr. p. 95, L. 11. Pierce's 
realtor informed Pierce that another realtor had listed the property, and that there was a problem 
with Pierce selling the property. Tr. p. 93, L. 5-14. According to the realtor, Pierce could not sell 
his property because Steve McMullen owned it. Tr. p. 33, L. 21-25; Tr. p. 94, L. 6-9. Pierce 
went to speak with McMullen's realtor who refused to discuss the matter with Pierce beyond 
telling him McMullen owned the property and they had the listing agreement. Tr. p. 24, L. 1-4; 
Tr. p. 94, L. 2-5. As a result of Pierce's inability to sell the property, the buyer did not make a 
written offer, and the sale fell through. Tr. p. 94, L. 6-9. 
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Respondents were engaged in a similar scheme in 2007, wherein Respondents "assisted" 
a distressed homeowner, Amy Birge. Tr. p. 111, L. 14. As a result of the Birge transaction, 
McMullen and Highland Financial, LLC were investigated by the Idaho Attorney General for 
consumer protection violations and fined for their conduct. Tr. p. 116, L. 10. At least six other 
people contacted Birge in response to a newspaper article about McMullen's activities, 
complaining that McMullen had done the same thing to them. Tr. p. 117, L. 17-25. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it dismissed the claims against the 
defaulted Respondents citing Pierce's failure to prove liability? 
B. Did the trial court en when it ruled that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does not 
apply to mortgage relief services that are scams? 
C. Did the trial court en when it dismissed Pierce's breach of implied in law contract 
claim? 
D. Were the trial court's Findings of Fact clearly enoneous? 
V. STANDARDS ON REVIEW 
A. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS 
When reviewing a discretionary decision, this Court determines whether the trial court 
(1) conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Blackmore v. RelMax Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558, 563, 237 P.3d 655, 
660 (2010). 
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B. ST A HITES AND CIVIL RULES 
The interpretation of a statute and its application to particular facts is a question of law 
over which the Court exercises free review. Sf. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofComm'rs of 
Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755,203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). This Court also exercises free review 
over questions regarding the interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Boise Mode, 
LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 294 P.3d 1111 (2013). 
C. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
If a written contract is complete on its face, unambiguous, and no party alleges fraud or 
mistake, "extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not 
admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." City of 
lvleridian v. Petra Inc. --- P.3d ----, 2013 WL 1286014 (2013) citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 
139,141,106 P.3d 465,467 (2005). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question oflaw over 
which this Court exercises free review. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLe, 140 Idaho 354, 93 
P.3d 685 (2004). If fraud or misrepresentation is alleged, admission of extrinsic evidence made 
prior to or contemporaneously with an agreement is proper to establish those representations 
were a material part of the bargain between the parties. Mikesell v. Newworld Development 
Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 876,840 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Ct.App.1992). 
D. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2,4 (2006). 
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Further, as held in PacifiCOlp v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 291 P.3d 442, 153 Idaho 759 
(Idaho 2012): 
This COUli recognizes that '[a] trial court's findings of fact will be upheld on 
appeal [and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous,] if the findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. It is the province of the trial judge to weigh 
the conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses.' 
The Senator, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd of Equalization, 138 Idaho 566, 569, 67 P.3d 
45, 48 (2003). This Court exercises free review over the district court's 
conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable 
law and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found.' Kennedy, 
151 Idaho at 442,259 P.3d at 588 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the rise in foreclosures nationwide, there has been a rise in the for-profit "mortgage 
rescue" companies who purport to assist property owners in saving their property from 
foreclosure. Mortgage Assistance Relief Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 75092, 75093, (December 1, 
20 1 O)(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 322). 
The scams perpetrated on property owners are varied, but generally lead to one 
conclusion. These companies deprive distressed property owners of their equity, and ultimately 
deprive them of their property. These mortgage foreclosure rescue scams have become so 
prevalent that in May, 2012 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) posted on its web site a 
Consumer Information Aleli outlining some of the more common scams. See Appendix A. As 
the law attempts to thwart these unlawful and deceptive acts and practices, these companies 
simply change the characteristics of what they are doing in order to skirt the law. 
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The present case is exactly the type of case which caused the FTC to post consumer 
warnings. Respondents Highland Financial, LLC and Steve McMullan held themselves out to 
Pierce to be a company that could rescue Pierce from foreclosure of his property. Likely in 
response to the Idaho Attorney General's previous sanction, McMullen attempted to skirt the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act by proclaiming to be "purchasers" of real estate. However, as 
the law and the facts make clear, McMullen was not engaged in a "purchase" of Pierce's 
distressed real estate. Rather, through a series of complex and confusing transactions, McMullen 
sought to skim Pierce's equity in the transaction without assuming any liability for the property. 
In addition to inducing Pierce through their advertising and representation to "sell" an interest in 
his property to McMullen, McMullen also made false verbal representations which caused Pierce 
to believe he was entering into a partnership that would provide mortgage rescue relief and save 
the equity in his property. Tr. p. 61, L. 24. 
The trial court, focusing on the "purchase and sale agreement," found that the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act was inapplicable to this transaction because Pierce was not purchasing 
anything. The trial court held that Pierce was selling his property to McMullen in exchange for 
"McMullen to perform acts in the future which McMullen apparently did not pelform." R. p. 
146. However, in reaching its conclusion, the trial court considered the "Purchase and Sale 
Agreement" in a vacuum, failing to consider the uncontroverted evidence of McMullen's oral 
representations that the purpose of the transaction was to rescue Pierce from foreclosure and 
retain an ownership interest in the property that would allow him substantial money back. Tr. p. 
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75, L. 11-] 5. McMullen engaged in unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of 
his business with Pierce and the court erred when it failed to so find. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED ApPELLANT'S 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFAULTED RESPONDENTS BASED UPON ApPELLANT'S 
FAILURE To PROVE LIABILITY 
The trial court dismissed Pierce's complaint and amended complaint against the defaulted 
Respondents. The trial cOUli held that Pierce failed to prove any of his claims and, therefore, 
dismissal was appropriate. R., p. 168. 
A default may be taken against a party who does not plead or otherwise defend against a 
complaint within the time prescribed. rd. R. Civ .P. 55(a)(1). Once default is entered, a 
judgment may issue. There are two instances when a default jUdgment may be taken after 
default: (1) when the claim against the person is for a sum certain or can be made certain by 
computation, rd. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), or (2) by application to the court. rd. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
[1]f, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any avennent by evidence or to make an investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as 
it deems necessary and proper .... " 
1d. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
It follows that whether to require proof of the underlying legal claims is within the sound 
discretion of the court. 1d. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). When reviewing a discretionary decision of the 
trial court, this Court "determine[s] whether the court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with applicable 
legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Blackmore v. ReiMax 
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Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558, 563, 237 P.3d 655, 660 (2010)(citing Lee v. Nickerson, 146 
Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467, 471 (2008)). A trial COlui's decision will not be overturned absent a 
manifest abuse of that discretion. Id. 
Although it is clear by the Rule that the trial court has discretion to take evidence as 
necessary to enable the trial court to enter judgment, the moving party generally has no 
obligation to prove the underlying facts of the case. Olson v. Kirkhanl, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 
P .2d 217, 220 (Ct.App.1986). On default, "all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint 
are deemed admitted," Cement Afasons'-Employers' Trust v. Davis, 107 Idaho 1131, 1132, 695 
P.2d 1270, 1271 (Ct.App.l985). Additionally, while the cOllli is not required to accept the legal 
conclusions of the moving party, there is nothing in the law that prohibits the court from doing 
so. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion respecting the defaulted Respondents in 
two separate ways. First, the court acted outside the boundaries of its discretion when it ruled on 
two separate occasions that the trial would only proceed on damages (Tr. p. 49, L. 6-14; Tr. p. 
55, L. 17-19), then reversed itself without notice to Pierce and dismissed Pierce's claim for 
failure to prove liability. Second, the trial court abused its discretion by misunderstanding and 
misinterpreting the law respecting default. R. p. 144. 
1. The Trial Court Acted Outside the Bounds of Its Discretion in Reversing 
its Own Prior Rulings Without Notice to Pierce. 
Pierce's case was dismissed by the district court for failure to present evidence regarding 
liability, or to present any legal argument regarding liability. R. p. 144. Pierce did not present 
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evidence at trial regarding liability because the trial court on two separate occasions ruled that 
proof of liability would not be required. The first ruling was at the April 25, 2011, hearing, when 
the district court granted Pierce's oral motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive 
damages: 
As I mentioned at the outset that complaint will have to be served and then either 
there is a response from McMullen or there's not if there is then I'll have a trial 
on punitives, and ~fcMllllen won't be allowed to defend the breach of contract 
causes of action, but could potentially defend the punitive damages but ifhe 
doesn't respond to the amended complaint then default will have to be taken again 
and we'll have a trial again on the amount of all damages .... 
T. p. 49, L. 6-14 (emphasis added). 
At the time of that ruling, McMullen had not answered the previous complaint and 
default had been obtained. R. p. 78. Counsel for Pierce clearly articulated Pierce's legal position 
to which the court made no comment: 
We've alleged I think something like six different violations of the Consumer 
Protection Act, all of which of course are now true since he hasn't answered the 
complaint, or we can presume to be true. 
Tr. p. 7, L. 12-19. 
Pierce served McMullen with the First Amended Complaint as required by the district 
court's order on June 8, 2011. Tr. p. 53, L. 5. Steve McMullen answered the amended 
complaint on behalf of himself and Highland Financial, LLC, however, the answer was stricken 
as to the Company's response because McMullen is not an attorney and cannot represent an 
entity. R., p. 135. McMullen's answer only addressed the claim for punitive damages, but did 
not generally deny the other averments in the amended complaint. R. p. 99. 
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The second time the court ruled that Pierce was not required to prove liability was on the 
morning of the trial. Respondent Highland Financial, LLC, had not responded to the complaint 
or amended complaint. Neither Respondent had produced a list of witnesses or evidence. 
McMullen was not present at trial. T. p. 53, L. 15. Pierce requested that the answer be stricken. 
T. p. 53, L. 20. The court granted Pierce's motion and ruled as follows: 
I think judgment by default against the defendant in this case is the appropriate 
sanction ... dismissal of his claims or his defenses are appropriate under that 
rule .. . he is defaulted, his answer is stricken, and the Plaintiffprevails on their 
claims, so what evidence of damage did the plaintiff want to put on today? 
T. p. 55, L. 2,11-19 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the ruling from the trial court on two separate occasions that the matter 
would proceed to hearing on damages only, it was reasonably foreseeable that Pierce would only 
present evidence of damages at trial. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it 
dismissed Pierce's case for failure to prove liability at trial. The trial court further abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a new trial when this error was brought to its attention. 
The trial cOUli ruled in order to enter judgment it was necessary for Appellant to proceed 
to trial on the issue of damages. It is a manifest abuse of discretion to rule on two occasions that 
presentation of proof of liability was not required, and then dismiss the case based on a lack of 
presentation at trial of proof of liability. That is, however, what the trial court did in this case: 
"instead of making any argument as to whether Pierce satisfied the requirements of I C. § 48-
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608(1), Pierce instead chose to leap ahead to the issue of damages ... " R., p. 140. "The Court 
finds Pierce has failed to prove liability under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act." R. p. 164, 
para. 31. "Due to Pierce's failure to prove liability under the Consumer Protection Act, repeated 
violations are not relevant and the Court will not reach that issue." R. p. 164, para. 33. 
The trial court abused its discretion in this case when it dismissed Pierce's complaint and 
amended complaint due to a failure to prove liability after the trial court limited the scope of the 
hearing to only damages. Pierce "leapt" ahead to the issue of damages, because that is what the 
court directed was the course he was to follow in order to obtain relief against the defaulted 
parties. Tr. p. 55, L. 17-19. 
2. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Misapprehended the Law 
Respecting Default. 
In addition to improperly reversing itself after trial, the trial court applied the incorrect 
legal standard to default. The court, citing Joyce v. Rubin, 23 Idaho 296, 304-05, 130 P. 793 
(1913), incorrectly held that Pierce must establish the material allegations of his complaint. R. p. 
144. However, Joyce v. Rubin is no longer good law on that point based upon a least two 
separate premises. First, this ruling has been superseded by modern rule of civil procedure 
55(b )(2), which is clear and unambiguous. There is nothing in this portion of the rule that 
mandates that Pierce must establish material allegations prior to entry of a default judgment. 
The rule yields to the sound discretion of the court to determine whether additional evidence is 
required in order to "enable the court to enter judgment or carry it into effect." Id. R. Civ. P. 
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55(b )(2). As previously set forth, the district court in the present case indicated it did not require 
any such proof, and in fact, ruled the opposite - twice. 
Second, the case of Olson v Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 720 P.2d 217 (Ct.App. 1986), while 
perhaps not directly overruling Joyce, certainly carves a deep divot into the Joyce holding. In 
the Olson case, a default and ultimately a default judgment had been taken against the Defendant 
Kirkham. The Defendant moved to set aside the default judgment claiming that it was en-or for 
the court not to require proof of facts sufficient to support the judgment. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 
Idaho at 37, 720 P.2d at 220. The Kirkham Defendant cited two cases for the proposition that 
proof of facts were required as a prerequisite to default judgment: Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. 
Gemmell, 41 Idaho 756, 242 P. 798 (1925)5 and Joyce v. Rubin, 23 Idaho 296,130 P. 793 (1913). 
The Olson court disagreed, holding that the Joyce decision was clearly distinguished from the 
class of cases where default is taken against one defendant and noted that in the Joyce case, "the 
parties proceeded on the theory that all material allegations of the pleadings were put in issue." 
Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho at 38,720 P.2d at 221. 
The Joyce case dealt with the establishment of water rights. The second assignment of 
enor in that case was that some of the defendants did not actually deny the allegations in the 
complaint; accordingly, the answer amounted to no defense. However, in the context of that case 
the court held: "[Un a water case like the one at bar, the court would not be justified in entering 
5 The Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Gemmell, case is also inapposite to the case at bar. First, one set of defaulting 
defendants was not served and default judgment was therefore denied. 41 Idaho 756, 242 P. at 800; and the other 
defendant had filed a cross-complaint which was completely inconsistent with and contrary to the allegations of 
plaintiff, creating an issue of proof. Id. 
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a judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint without requiring the plaintiff to 
prove his case." Joyce v. Rubin, 23 Idaho 296,130 P. 793, 796 (1913). 
The Joyce case does not stand for the proposition, as the trial court stated in its 
memorandum decision, that in the context of a default in this case that "the plaintiff. .. must 
establish by proof the material allegations of his complaint." R. p. 144. 
The district court further held that since neither the complaint nor the amended complaint 
in this case was verified, that it could not be accorded any evidentiary value under Id. R. Civ. P. 
56(e). R. p. 144. While that argument may be true in the context of summary judgment, in the 
case of a default, a complaint need not be verified to be taken as true when the Defendant fails to 
deny the allegations. Id. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 
Pierce has no obligation to introduce evidence in support of the allegations of the 
complaint. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 P.2d 217, 220 (Ct.App.1986); that is unless 
the Court ordered proof of the claims be submitted, which it did not. 
3. An Affirmative Denial to each Averment in a Pleading is Required or the 
Averment is Deemed Admitted. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( d) unambiguously states that denials to all averments in 
a pleading to which a response is required must be affirmatively asserted. Failure to deny renders 
the averment admitted.6 Id. R. Civ. P. 8(d). After having previously defaulted, Respondent 
Steve McMullan filed an answer to the first amended complaint which only denied the punitive 
damage allegations. R. 99, p. 2. 
6 Except in very limited circumstances not applicable here. 
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Respondent Steve McMullan did not deny the averments in sections I (parties), II 
Gurisdiction), III (general allegations), IV (violations of Title 48, Chapter 6, Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act), or IV(sic), (breach of implied-in-Iaw contract). In fact, McMullen admitted he 
was an investment partner with Plaintiff to help Plaintiff save the property from foreclosure. R. 
99, p. 2. Respondent Highland Financial, LLC, did not respond at all. 
C. THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT ApPLIES To THE "FORECLOSURE 
RESCUE" SERVICES OFFERED By RESPONDENTS 
The present case brings forward an issue of first impression in Idaho: whether the 
Respondents, who held themselves out to the public and Pierce as a foreclosure rescue company 
providing foreclosure rescue services to its customers, are subj ect to the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act, I.C. § 48-601 et seq. (hereinafter "I CPA" or "the 
Act") and its federal counterpart, 15 U.S.c. 45(a)(1), proscribe unlawful and deceptive conduct 
within the course of trade or commerce. Specifically, I.C. § 48-608 provides a remedy for 
individuals who have been the victim of unlawful and deceptive acts and practices, and provides 
in relevant part: 
(1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers any 
ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or 
employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by 
this chapter, may treat any agreement incident thereto as voidable or, in the 
alternative, may bring an action to recover actual damages or one thousand dollars 
($1,000), whichever is the greater; provided, however, that in the case of a class 
action, the class may bring an action for actual damages or a total for the class 
that may not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is the greater. Any 
such person or class may also seek restitution, an order enjoining the use or 
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employment of methods, acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter 
and any other appropriate relief which the court in its discretion may deem just 
and necessary. The comi may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may 
provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper in cases of repeated 
or flagrant violations. 
I.C. § 48-608(1) 
In the context of this case, to fall within the ICPA, Pierce must be a "person" who 
purchased "goods" or "services" from McMullen, and that McMullen's conduct was proscribed 
by the ICPA. 
Trade or commerce is defined by the ICPA as "[t]he advertising, offering for sale, selling, 
leasing, renting, collecting debts arising out of the sale or lease of goods or services or 
distributing goods or services ... " I.C. § 48-602(2). The trial court found McMullen was not 
subject to the Act, because Pierce was not a "person who purchases or leases goods or services 
and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money _ .. " because he was selling his property, not 
purchasing anything (R., p. 145), and the transaction between McMullen and Pierce did not 
involve "goods" or "services". R. pp. 165-66, paras. 1-6. 
Pierce respectfully submits that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, as well as misperceiving the facts in evidence before it. 
The problem with the trial cOUli's analysis is that it refused to consider the surrounding 
facts and circumstances related to the interaction between McMullen and Pierce and focused 
solely on one document purported to be a "contract" to purchase Pierce's land. McMullen did 
not approach Pierce to purchase his property_ Pierce did not approach McMullen to sell his 
property_ Rather, Pierce responded to advertising by McMullen that it was in the business of 
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providing foreclosure rescue services to distressed property owners. Pierce met with McMullen 
and engaged McMullen's services, and received financial counseling that included the execution 
of the documents considered by the trial court. The exchange of title was part of the course of 
conduct that McMullen advised Pierce to take. This proscribed course of action set in motion by 
McMullen damaged Pierce with the intent of benefiting McMullen. 
The Idaho bankruptcy court characterized a similar financial advice scam as falling 
within the parameters of the ICPA in the case of In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839 (D. Idaho 2001), 
wherein the cOUli held: 
It offered to exchange cash in the form of a lump sum payment to its clients in 
return for the assignment of the clients' right to receive annuity payments due over 
time. See Idaho Code § 48-602(6); Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 
596 P.2d 429, 432 (1979) (construing the definition under the Act of "goods" to 
include intangible property). When the facts are seen in this fashion, Defendant is 
simply a modern day moneychanger. It traded cash for contract rights, and in the 
process, offered its "clients" financial advice (i.e., a "service") in achieving their 
particular financial goals. As explained in the regulations adopted by the State of 
Idaho under the ICP A, Joshua Wiggins was a consumer in responding to 
Defendant's offers. See IDAPA 04.02.01.020.13. 
In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 856 (D. Idaho 2001). 
The analysis utilized by the federal court is equally applicable to the present case. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that mortgage foreclosure relief 
services that are scams do not fall within the parameters of the ICP A. Pierce is a person who 
purchased foreclosure relief services from McMullen and suffered an ascertainable loss because 
of McMullen's unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 21 
1. The Idaho Consumer Protection Act is Remedial and Its Legislative Purpose is 
to Protect Unwary Consumers From Unscrupulous Business Practices. 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act is remedial in nature and is to be broadly constmed 
to fulfill Idaho's public policy of protecting consumers and businesses from unfair methods of 
competition, and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, and 
"to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection ... . " I.C. § 48-601. 
The purpose of a remedial statute is to pull within its borders conduct that clearly violates public 
policy, but that might not otherwise be subject to a fair and purposeful remedy. The Act applies 
to both personal and commercial transactions. Myers v. A.a. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc, 
114 Idaho 432, 441, 757 P.2d 695, 704 (1988)7 
a. "Goods or Services" Includes the Sale o/Cash 
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are comparable to those recited in the case 
of In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839 (D. Idaho 2001). Although Wiggins did not involve mortgage 
foreclosure relief services, the bankruptcy court found in Wiggins, as it should here, that the 
violator engaged in an unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of trade or 
commerce as provided in I.e. § 48-603C. I.C. § 48-603(18). 
7 In the Myers case, the Defendants argued that the ICP A did not apply because the transaction was "commercial" in 
nature. The Court in Myers found that the ICPA does apply to commercial transactions: 
When construing the ICPA we are instructed to give "due consideration and great weight" to interpretations 
by the federal trade commission and the federal courts of § 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
Our research has revealed no federal cases suggesting that the comparable federal act is not intended to 
protect the ultimate consumer of a product merely because that consumer intends to use the product in a 
for-profit business. 
* * * 
Both the statute and the regulation include the same broad, all-inclusive definition of goods ... [F]inding no 
authority to the contrary, we hold that the ICPA is applicable to [commercial] transactions. 
Myers v. A.a. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc, 114 Idaho 432, 441,757 P.2d 695, 704 (l988)(citations omitted). 
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In the Wiggins case, Joshua Wiggins suffered injuries as the result of an automobile 
accident when he was a minor. By the time a settlement was effectuated, he was an adult. With 
the guidance of his family and attorney, Wiggins entered into a structured settlement providing 
payments that were to total $150,000. Id. at 846. 
Under the settlement agreement, Wiggins received a lump sum of $50,000 and another 
$5,852 from his own under-insured motorist coverage. Id. In addition, an annuity was purchased 
for Wiggins' benefit. This annuity provided for payments of $375 per month guaranteed for 
twenty years, beginning July 1, 1999. The amount of the monthly payments was to increase by 
two percent compounded annually. Id. In addition, Wiggins was to receive three additional lump 
sum payments of$3,600, payable on January 5 and August 5, 1998, and January 5, 1999. Id. 
Defendant specialized in purchasing structured personal injury and other settlement 
payment streams for cash at a discounted present value. Defendant then resold the settlements or 
annuities for a profit. Id. 847-48. Through this process, structured settlement owners sold their 
annuity for a reduced amount of cash. Id. Defendant, through his adveliising, offered a 
"settlement re-financing system." Id. at 856. 
As a result of the Defendant's advertising, Wiggins inquired of Defendant about 
Defendant purchasing his annuity. In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. at 848. In response to Wiggins' 
inquiry, Defendant made specific oral and written offers to provide Wiggins with cash and other 
"financial services" in connection with the transaction. Id. at 856-57. Wiggins accepted 
Defendant's offer and sold his future right to receive 116 monthly payments and one lump sum 
payment of$3,600 due on January 5, 1999, for a total of$17,699 in cash. Id. at 851. 
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The Defendant in the Wiggins case took the same position as that taken by the trial court 
in the present case: That the Defendant was a "purchaser" not a "seller" and there were no goods 
or services being sold. R., p. 159. The bankruptcy COUli flatly rejected such a narrow analysis 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. In its decision the bankruptcy court held: 
As a threshold matter, Dcfendant argues it is not subject to the provisions of the 
ICP A as it was not engaged in the sale or lease of goods or services. Specifically, 
Defendant asserts that it was a purchaser of Wiggins' right to receive the 
annuity payments, and that the annuitant (i.e., 'Viggins) was the seller. 
"Goods" are defined broadly under the ICP A to include any tangible or intangible 
personal property or "thing of value." Idaho Code § 48-602(6). "Services" are 
defined in a similarly expansive fashion to encompass any "work, labor or any 
other act or practice performed by a seller to or on behalf of a consumer." Idaho 
Code § 48-602(7) (emphasis added). 
Guided by these broad notions, the facts do not support Defendant's contention. 
Defendant proudly offered to provide its goods and services to Wiggins and 
others in Idaho via a national cable television advertising campaign .... 
In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839, 855-56 (D. Idaho 2001) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the trial court found that McMullen was holding out through 
advertising as a company that could save property owners from foreclosure. R., p. 157. The 
trial court also found that Pierce relied upon the advertising and sought assistance from 
McMullen. R., p. 157. However, the trial court stopped short of acknowledging that the 
"assistance" that Pierce sought was a service offered by McMullen. As previously noted, 
McMullen was offering a mortgage foreclosure rescue service to property owners. The fact that 
an exchange of title was part of that service does not abrogate the fact that McMullen offered a 
service to Pierce, which also included a sale of money. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 24 
As in Wiggins, McMullen presented a stack of documents to Pierce for his signature. 
McMullen "explained" to Pierce the legal effect of the documents, while reassuring Pierce they 
achieved the objective he had outlined for Pierce. Tr. p. 61, L. 21. Also like Wiggins, McMullen 
made specific oral promises, consistent with the purpose of Pierce's consultation with him to 
save his property. Tr. p. 61, L. 21, p. 70, L. 1-9. Unlike Wiggins, however, Pierce never 
received any money for his interest in the property. Tr., p. 65, L. 17. 
The district court relied on Idaho First Nat 'I Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho 256, 596 P.2d 429 
(1970), for the proposition that, "goods" under the ICP A could encompass money (Idaho First 
Nat? Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho at 259, 596 P.2d at 432), but not in the instant case. Rather, the 
district court found that like the Wells', Pierce was not purchasing anything, but rather selling his 
property. R., p. 145. Unfortunately, the trial court overlooked three important distinctions 
between the Pierce case and the Wells case. 
First, the Wells' were guarantors on a loan for a third party, their corporation, who was 
the actual borrower. Idaho First Nat'/ Bankv. Wells, 100 Idaho at 260,596 P.2d at 433. Second, 
the jury resolved the issue of the bank's alleged ICPA violation, by determining that the forms 
were not signed in blank as the Wells' contended. Idaho First Nat '/ Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho at 
263, 596 P.2d at 436. Finally, the trial court in its analysis failed to recognize that the activities 
of banks are regulated through the Federal Reserve System, not the Federal Trade Commission, 
which was pointed out by the Court in Wells. The Wells Court therefore reasoned, "the act 
complained of by the appellants is not within the scope of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act." 
Idaho First Nat'/ Bank v. Wells, 100 Idaho at 259,596 P.2d at 432. 
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In the case at Bar, the Contract for Purchase and Sale purports to give Pierce a $30,000 
promissory note and $20,000 at "closing." Trial Exhibit 1. Pierce testified he received nothing. 
Tr. p. 65, L. 17. Although not clear, a closer look at the document implies that the $20,000 that 
Pierce was to receive, but did not, may have been the funds used by McMullen to pay the lender 
to "rescue" the property from foreclosure. Trial Exh. 1. McMullen's methods in "rescuing" 
Pierce's property are unconscionable in violation of I.C. § 48-603(18). Although the full 
$20,000 was not paid to the lender, Pierce never received $20,000, or any portion thereof, from 
McMullen even though the document states: 
Balance after close, (U.S. Cash, certified or cashier's check) subject to 
adjustments and prorations: $20,000 
Trial Exh. 1. 
Arguably (although difficult to divine from the documents), the amount for which 
McMullen would really be liable to Pierce is dependent upon how much of the money 
supposedly owed to Pierce was used to: (1) save Pierce's property from foreclosure; and (2) to 
pay Pierce's mortgage payments while the marketing and sale of the property was going forward. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that McMullen purchased nothing. Any liability to Pierce on 
the part of McMullen was reduced commensurately with the length of time McMullen paid the 
mOligage with Pierce's proceeds. Of course, the original mortgage loans on the property 
remained in Pierce's name, making McMullen's risk essentially non-existent as he purchased 
nothing. 
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In other words, just as the court correctly concluded in Wiggins, Pierce purchased 
"money." McMullen induced Pierce to enter into a transaction that was excessively one-sided in 
favor of McMullen in violation of I.C. § 48-603C(c), making McMullen's actions an 
unconscionable method, act or practice under I.C. § 48-603(18). Thus, the Wells case is 
inapposite to this case and the district court's reliance on it to establish that the present case does 
not fall within the purview of the ICP A was in error. 
b. The "Foreclosure Relief" Advertised and Offered by McMullen is a Service Under 
the/CPA 
If the transaction at hand were a simple purchase and sale as the court held in its 
Memorandum of Findings, R. p. 146, the record is completely devoid of any indices that the 
property was simply being sold by Pierce to McMullen in an arms' length transaction. First, 
Pierce saw a sign on the road advertising foreclosure rescue and went to see McMullen about 
receiving help. R, p. 157. Second, the record certainly does not reflect a land sale. There is no 
evidence in the record that a HUD-l settlement statement was presented to Pierce; or that a 
preliminary title report was ordered; that a payoff statement was obtained from the lender; or that 
documents were recorded to reflect the sale; and finally, and perhaps most importantly, Pierce 
never received any money for his property (worth at least $399,000 per McMullen's own written 
document Trial Exh. 19) and Pierce was never relieved of liability for the loan. This transaction 
was not an arm's length purchase and sale. It is clear from the evidence in the record that it was 
a scam to benefit McMullen. The nature of this transaction was misleading, false, and deceptive 
in violation ofLC. § 48-603(17). 
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Pursuant I.C. § 48-604(1), the court is to give "due consideration and great weight" to the 
analysis and interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission for purposes of interpreting the 
ICPA. 
There have been a number of cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission against 
mortgage rescue relief operations pursuant to section 5(a) of the Federal Trade commission Act 
(15 U.S.C. 45(a)(I» for engaging in unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in the course of 
providing "foreclosure relief' to consumers. 8 
Although the facts of the FTC cases are not precisely on point with the case at bar, the 
common thread among them is that McMullen was targeting, with advertising (in violation of 
I.C. § 48-603(9», distressed consumers whose property was at risk of foreclosure in order to 
skim the equity from the unsuspecting consumer. The Defendants who were under fire with the 
Federal Trade Commission, like McMullen in this case, offered a variety of schemes to 
"prevent" foreclosure of a consumer's property, and were found to have violated Section 5(a)(1) 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1), in those schemes. 
The courts in the above cited FTC cases consistently defined a mortgage loan 
modification or foreclosure relief service as one which encompasses 
[a]ny good, service, plan, or program that is represented, expressly or by 
implication, to assist a consumer in any manner to ... stop, prevent, or postpone 
any home mortgage or deed of trust foreclosure sale ... obtain any forbearance 
from any mortgage loan holder or servicer. .. obtain a loan or advance of funds 
8 See e.g., FTC v. Federal Loan Modification Law Center, LLP et al., SA-CV-09-401-CJC (MLGx), (U.S. Dist. Ct., 
Central Dist. Cal. 2010); FTC v. Home Assure, LLC, et aI., 8:09-cv-547-T-23TBM (Dist. ct. Middle Dist. FI., 
Tampa Division); FTC v. Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, et al., 1 :08-cv-1075 (Dist. Ct. N. Dist. Ohio, Eastern 
Division); FTC v. United Home Savers, LLP, et aI., 8:08-cv-01735-VMC-TBM (U.S. Dist. Ct. Mid. Dist. Florida 
(2008); FTC v. Loss Mitigation Services, Inc., et al.,09-CV -800 (U.S Dist. Ct. Ctrl Dist. of Cal.). 
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that is connected to the consumer's home ownership ... save the consumer's 
residence from foreclosure ... obtain or arrange a refinancing, recapitalization, or 
reinstatement of a home loan, deed of trust, or mortgage ... the foregoing shall 
include any manner of claimed assistance, including but not limited to, debt, 
credit, budget, or financial counseling; receiving money the purpose of 
distributing it to creditors; contacting creditors or servicers on behalf of the 
consumer; and giving advice of any kind with respect to filing for bankruptcy.9 
See e.g., FTC v. Federal Loan Modification Law Center, LLP et al., SA-CV-09-401-CJC 
(MLGx)(U.S. Dist. Ct., Central Dist. Cal. 2010), p. 6. 
In this case, McMullen and Highland held themselves out as a company who could assist 
in preventing foreclosure. Tr. p. 14, L. 6; Tr. p. 58, L. 16. In fact, Pierce was not the only victim 
of McMullen. Amy Birge testified at trial that she too, was in a dire financial condition and on 
the brink oflosing her home to foreclosure. Tr. 107, L. 2-4. Birge further testified that she made 
contact with Respondents through a "friend" named Heidi Russell who was employed by 
McMullen. Tr. p. 106, L. 5-6. iO Birge went to see McMullen who vowed to assist her in 
keeping her home. Tr. p. 106, L. 22. Like Pierce, McMullen presented a number of documents 
to Birge and made oral promises that McMullen could stop the foreclosure. McMullen told 
Birge she could stay in her home, and that after a period of time, would be able to repurchase the 
propeliy. Tr. pp. 106, L. 20 107, L. 17. Ultimately, Birge was forced out of her home, (Tr. p. 
115), L. 5-8, and some $70,000 in equity from the property was pocketed by McMullen. Tr. p. 
9 On December 1, 2010, The Federal Trade Commission promulgated 16 CFR part 322, which specifically focuses 
on mortgage rescue relief providers who prey upon homeowners. 
10 The person who worked for McMullen and encouraged Amy Birge to go see him for help, was named Heidi 
RusselL The person who ignored Pierce's subpoena to appear at trial was named Heidi Russell and is the same 
person who was the named "trustee" and recipient of the Power of Attorney laid out in the documents presented to 
Pierce, although Pierce never met her personally. Tr. p. 22, L. 14. 
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] 16, L. 22-25, p. 117, L. 1-5. Just as with Pierce, Birge lost her property and her equity. Tr. p. 
117,L.1-5. 
Arguably both Birge and Pierce could have lost their equity through the eminent 
foreclosures they each faced. Notwithstanding, that is not the standard to determine whether 
McMullen was offering goods or services in violation of the ICP A. McMullen, through his 
advertising, lured Birge, Pierce, and apparently at least six others into believing he could help 
them. As a result, they lost any opportunity to work with their lenders to seek a remedy. 
c. The Contract is Purposefully Misleading, Confusing, and Ambiguous. 
There is no dispute that Pierce and McMullen entered into a contract of some kind. The 
question is whether the contract is one for a simple purchase and sale of land, as the trial court 
suggests, or if the contract is really a foreclosure rescue relief scam. 
Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 93 P.3d 685, 
692 (2004). A contract is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one interpretation. Id. 
Where there is a fully integrated and executed written contract, the intent of the pmiies 
must be determined by reference to the writing. The parol evidence rule will preclude prior or 
contemporaneous agreements from being considered. Miller Canst. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 
187,697 P.2d 1201 (Ct.App. 1985). However, "'[t]he parol evidence rule comes into play only 
when the last expression is in writing and is a binding contract. ' .... " Id( citation omitted).]] 
11 Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the parol evidence rule does not come into play in cases of 
fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake or other matters which render a contract void or voidable. Gillespie v. 
Mountain Park Estates, LLC., 138 Idaho 27,56 P.3d 1277 (2002). 
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In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and 
proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument. C & 
G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). To determine whether a contract is 
ambiguous, a court looks at the face of the document and gives the words or phrases used their 
established definitions in common use or settled legal meanings. Id. A contract phrase is 
patently ambiguous when there are "two different reasonable interpretations or the language is 
nonsensical." Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 
1277, 1280 (2010); Buku properties, LLC, v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027 (2013); 
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743 (2007). 
More importantly here, the parol evidence rule does not apply to averments of fraud, 
misrepresentation, mutual mistake or other matters which render a contract void or voidable. 
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 56 P.3d 1277 (2002). The heart of the 
ICP A is to prevent deception and misrepresentation. The ICP A provides as one of its remedies, 
the ability to treat an agreement subject to the ICPA as voidable. I.C. § 48-608(1). Thus, a 
dispute resulting from an agreement entered into that is subject to the ICPA, is subject to the 
parol evidence rule. 
The allowance of oral and written representations made prior to or contemporaneously 
with an agreement where fraud was alleged, is proper to establish those representations were a 
material part of the bargain between the parties. Mikesell v. Newworld Development Corp. 
122 Idaho 868, 876, 840 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Ct.App.1992). 
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In Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984), this Court made clear that 
"fraud in the inducement is always admissible to show that representations by one party were a 
material part of the bargain." Evidence that establishes fraudulent misrepresentations, with the 
purpose of inducing a party into a transaction, is admissible. Id. 
In this case, the district court found that the contract was not ambiguous. R. p. 159. 
Likewise, the district court apparently did not consider that Pierce alleged material 
misrepresentations in his complaint. The court ignored the fact that there were two different 
prices at which the property was allegedly to be purchased on the face of the document. Trial 
Exh. 1. The purchase price is "not to exceed $329,000." Trial Exh. 1. The purchase price is 
also "not to exceed $324,000." Trial Exh. 1. Clearly, these two clauses setting forth the 
purchase price(s) to be paid are subject to more than one interpretation. 
Additionally, the time for acceptance and effective date of the document is December 18, 
2007, Trial Exh. 1, p. 1, however, the document indicates, and the court found, that Steve 
McMullan did not sign the document until December 19,2007. Trial Exh. 1, p. 2; R, p. 156. 
The court also overlooked the fact that, while the document stated that Pierce was to 
receive "$20,000 at closing subject to prorations and offsets", Trial Exh. 1, Pierce never received 
$20,000 or any portion thereof. Tr., p. 43, L. 20. Moreover, Pierce was also to receive a 
$30,000 promissory note which was payable upon selling or refinancing the 40.4 acres, however, 
on the last page of the document, it states that "$30,000 that is due to the seller will be reduced 
by any monthly mortgage payments not paid, or any funds needed to keep the property out of 
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foreclosure, and to produce a clear title." Trial Exh. 1, p. 7. The uncontroverted evidence 
suggests the propeliy was already in foreclosure. Tr. p. 42, L. 4-14. 
Additionally, since the $30,000 could be reduced for "mortgage payments not made," and 
Respondent was supposedly assuming the mortgage per the document, a reading of that language 
would indicate that if the Respondent did not make the payments under the contract, then Pierce 
would have to make them from the $30,000 he was owed. Such a result is nonsensical at best. 
Of course, it could also mean that Pierce's proceeds would be spent paying the mortgage, 
even though McMullan supposedly "owned" the property, until McMullan sold the property and 
collected the equity. 
When reviewing the purchase and sale agreement in conjunction with the document 
entitled "information about your property," the documents also state conflicting amounts owed 
on the mortgage that are, presumably, part of the "purchase" price. The purchase and sale 
agreement states that the present principal balance is $294,000. Trial Exh. 1. However, Trial 
Exhibit 19 states that the mortgage owed is $288,000. 
Additionally, if in fact the purchase price is "not to exceed" $329,000, or $324,000, the 
terms set forth in the agreement do not total either of those amounts. The mortgage that was to 
be assumed is stated as having a balance of $294,000. Trial Exh., p. 1. The amount Pierce was 
to receive, according to the agreement, is $30,000 plus $20,000 for a total of $50,000. Taken 
together, $294,000 and $50,000 total $344,000, not $329,000 or $324,000. 
Finally, payment of the $30,000 to Pierce was "contingent upon refinancing or sale of the 
40.4 acres." Nonetheless, the trial court found that the legal descriptions attached to the contract 
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that purported to be the property being sold, did not total 40.4 acres. "The court also finds the 
number a/parcels and acreage at issue is not corroborated by Exhibits A-D a/Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1." R., pp. 157-58. Of course, Exhibits A-D are the subject of the "purchase and sale" 
document, as they are attached to and referenced in that document (and almost all the other 
documents presented to Pierce) and referenced therein. Trial Exh. 1. The question then 
becomes, what was Pierce "selling" and Respondent "purchasing"? Based upon the "four 
corners" of the "contract for purchase and sale," it is clear, provisions in the document are 
subject to more than one interpretation. Thc document is ambiguous. If the document is 
ambiguous, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and the court may look to extrinsic evidence 
to interpret the "intent" of the parties. Electrical TfTf10lesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 
Idaho 814,41 P.3d 242 (2001). 
Given the ambiguous nature of the contract in question, and Pierce's averments of 
misrepresentation, the court erred when it did not consider the uncontroverted extrinsic evidence 
presented by Pierce, including oral statements made by McMullen, to consider whether 
McMullen engaged in an unlawful and deceptive act or practice when he entered into the 
agreement with Pierce to assist Pierce in "saving" his property from foreclosure. 
Moreover, the trial court did not appear to even consider the "trust agreement" which 
transferred the property into a trust. The trust agreement supports Pierce's testimony that it was 
represented to him that he would retain an interest in the property. Pierce was the beneficiary of 
the trust. Pierce clearly did not understand the import of the trust agreement, power of attorney 
and assignment, believing the documents were part of the "partnership" between he and 
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McMullen. Tr. p. 22, L. 2-5; Tr. p. 74, L. 10. The trial court simply ignored all the extrinsic 
evidence which should have properly been considered in the context of the Iep A, and found that 
Pierce had no right to rely on the oral representations of McMullen. 12 R. p. 149. 
d. Inconsistent Oral Promises are a Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
Respondent made oral promises to Pierce that he would receive $30,000 (based on the 
promissory note), plus one-half of the equity from the property asserting that the two were 
"partners" in the sale ofthe land. Tr. p. 16, L. 19; Tr. p. 21, L. 6. The trial court, in its analysis 
blames Pierce, asserting that "Pierce had no right to rely on .McMullen 's oral representations ... " 
because Respondent's oral representations were at odds with the written documents. R., p. 150. 
However, the trial court's analysis is directly at odds with IDAP A, which makes it an unlawful 
or deceptive act or practice under the Act to make oral representations that are at odds with the 
written representations: 
It is an unfair and deceptive act or practice for a seller to make any claim or 
representation that is inconsistent with or contradictory to any written claim, 
representation, or provision which is contained in any contract, document, or 
instrument evidencing a transaction. 
IDAPA 04.02.01.032 
Additionally, the documents given to Pierce to sign provided for cancellation, and a fee 
for doing so. Trial Exh. 20. Although when Pierce attempted to cancel his agreement with 
McMullen, which he believed he had a right to do, McMullen refused to cancel the transaction. 
Tr. pp. 86-87, L 23-25; L. 1. 
12 Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 402, 690 P.2d 333,337 (1984)(the trial court erred in ruling 
that the parol evidence rule precluded admission of evidence offered to establish fraudulent representations made to 
induce the appellants into the transaction). 
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The trial court interpreted the "right to cancel" document, claiming that it did not apply in 
Pierce's case because it did not refer to the "Contract for Purchase and Sale" and therefore 
"provide[s] no modification to the 'Contract for Purchase and Sale.'" R. p. 150. However, the 
document does refer to the purchase and sale "You have signed and agreed to any for (sic) the 
following documents which are hereby called contract ... Purchase and Sale to retain the 
services of Highland Financial LLC' Trial Exh. 20. Clearly, the trial court's analysis fails by its 
misreading. 
Even if, arguendo, the right to cancel did not refer to the purchase and sale agreement, it 
would make no difference. The "seller" - Respondent represented to Pierce that Pierce could 
cancel the contract (for services) vis-a.-vis the "right to cancel" document, for a "fee." Trial Exh. 
20. Even if the right to cancel document was at odds with the other documents, the inconsistent 
representations of Respondent are a violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. IDAP A 
04.02.01.032. 
2. Pierce Showed an Ascertainable Loss Pursuant to the Iep A. 
Pursuant to the ICP A, it is presumed that an aggrieved party who has suffered an 
ascertainable loss incurred damages. I.C. § 48-608(1). Collectable damages under the ICPA are 
actual damages or $1000 whichever is greater. Id. What is considered an "ascertainable loss" is 
broad. The IDAPA interprets an ascertainable loss pursuant to I.C. § 48-608(1) as follows: 
Ascertainable Loss. Any deprivation, detriment, or injury, or any decrease in 
amount, magnitude, or degree that is capable of being discovered, observed, or 
established. It is not necessary for a private plaintiff to prove actual damages 
of a specific dollar amount to prove ascertainable loss, but only that the item 
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was different from that for which the private plaintiff bargained, or that the 
private plaintiff suffered some like loss. 
IDAPA 04.02.01.020.05 (emphasis added). 
In its findings of fact, the court found that "it is clear there is some damage, but the Court 
finds Pierce has not proven any specific amount. Additionally, the Courtfinds Pierce has failed 
to prove liability under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act." R p. 164, para. 31. The trial court 
misapprehended the law respecting the required proof to establish an ascertainable loss. As 
clearly stated in IDAPA 04.02.01.020.05, a plaintiff is not required to show the specific dollar 
amount of damages to prove an asceliainable loss. 
The trial court further erred inasmuch as Pierce did show his damages with particularity. 
Pierce testified that he was to receive $30,000 off the top, and one-half his equity from the 
agreement with Respondent. Tr. p. 63, L. 22-25. Pierce received neither of these promised 
benefits. 
The trial court found that McMullen represented to Pierce that Pierce would "still have an 
interest in the property." R. p. 158, para. 8. The trial court also found that the property was 
being marketed for $650,000, and that Pierce had an interested buyer. R p. 158, para. 10. The 
trial court further found that McMullen, through his actions, caused Pierce to be unable to sell 
the property. R, p. 158, para. 9. Despite the district court's findings, it also found that Pierce 
did not show an ascertainable loss because he could not show specific damages. 
Although Pierce was not certain what the property would ultimately sell for, he testified 
that he had a potential buyer who wanted to make an offer, but could not because the Respondent 
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had listed it with another real estate agent who asselied that Pierce had no interest in the 
propeliy. Tr. p. 85, L. 7-16. Pierce further testified that he believed he had lost between 
$200,000 and $250,000, (Tr. p. 94, L. 10-14), but that he lost at least $55,000, based on 
Respondent's assessment of equity, Trial Exh. 19; Tr. p. 95, L. 6-10, plus the $30,000 he was to 
receive "off the top." Pierce further testified that he was asking for $80,000 in special damages 
under the circumstances. Tr. p. 98, L. 16-18. 
3. Pierce Proved Flagrant or Repeated Conduct Warranting Punitive Damages. 
The Idaho Consumer Protection Act provides that an aggrieved party may be awarded 
punitive damages in the trial couli's discretion, in cases of repeated or tlagrant violations. I.C. § 
48-608(1). 
Pierce presented uncontrovelied evidence of Respondent's tlagrant and repeated 
violations, even in the face of an investigation and fine by the attorney general. Pierce called 
witness Amy Birge who was also a victim of Respondent. Birge testified at length regarding 
what had occurred in her case, and that the Idaho Attorney General investigated and "fined" 
Respondent for his acts. Tr. p. 116, L. 10. Birge also testified that "half-dozen" other people 
contacted her who had also been "taken advantage of by Highland Financial." Tr. p. 117, L. 20-
25. 
Nonetheless, the trial court found that proof of Respondent's repeated violations were 
irrelevant because Pierce did not prove liability under the ICP A. R., p. 164, para. 32. In its 
conclusions of law, the couli found "no violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ... no 
repeated violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ... no tlagrant violations of the Idaho 
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Consumer Protection Act." R, p. 167, para. 10. Because the court premised its conclusions 
regarding repeated and flagrant violations of the ICP A on its erroneous conclusion that the ICP A 
was not violated, the court's conclusions in regard to punitive damages is also erroneous, thus 
the court abused its discretion whether or not to award punitive damages. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED PIERCE'S IMPLIED IN LAW 
CONTRACT CLAIM 
In its analysis, the trial court found that Pierce had abandoned his implied-in-Iaw contract 
claim. R, p. 138. However, as stated above, the court ruled prior to trial that Respondent would 
not be allowed to defend "the breach of contract causes of action." Tr. p. 49, L. 6-8. The court 
also ruled on the day of trial that "plaintiff prevails on their claims." Tr. p. 55, L. 17. Plaintiff 
pled a breach of implied contract claim and, given the court's ruling, was not required to put on 
evidence to prove the claim. 
An implied-in-Iaw contract is a legal fiction to provide a remedy where none would 
otherwise exist. The point of an implied-in-Iaw contract is to bring about justice and equity. 
Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 930 P.2d 1026 (1997). "We employ the phrase "implied-in-
law contract" synonymously with quasi-contract, unjust emichment, and restitution." Allen v. 
Dunston, 131 Idaho 464,958 P.2d 1150 (1998)(citations omitted). 
While it is true that Pierce's post trial brief mislabeled the claim "breach of common law 
contract," he was not pleading such for the first time as the trial court suggests in its analysis. R., 
p. 138.13 Rather, Pierce pled implied-in-Iaw breach of contract as an alternative averment in the 
13 Although a party may amend a complaint at any time, including post trial to confonn to the evidence. Id. R. Civ 
P. 15, this is not what Pierce was intending. 
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event the court did not otherwise find that a "true contract" existed and argued in his post-trial 
brief for a breach of implied in law contract. The purpose of the averment was to assure Pierce 
have a remedy where one may not otherwise exist. The court found that "the only thing Pierce 
purchased' was future acts by McMullen ... " R., p. 146. The court also found that McMullen 
did not perform these "future acts." R., p. 146. 14 Pierce did not abandon his breach of implied in 
law contract claim. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside absent a finding that they are clearly 
erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). The 
Supreme Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Bettweiser v. 
New York Irrigation Dist. --- Idaho ----, 2013 WL 646270 (2013), citing Borah v. McCandless, 
147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009). It is clear in this case, that the trial court made 
several erroneous findings of fact and they should be set aside. 
First, the court found that there was no evidence to support Pierce's belief that he was 
only selling a "partial" interest in the property in exchange for assistance in catching up his 
mortgage payment. R., p. 157-58, para. 11. However, the trial court specifically found that 
Respondent represented to Pierce that he would still have an interest in the property. R. p. 158, 
para. 8. The uncontroverted testimony of Pierce was that he believed that he was only selling an 
interest in the property to Respondent, and that he would retain an interest in the property, and 
that the parties would be "partners." Tr. p. 70, L. 2-13; Tr. p. 91, L. 2-4. The court's finding at 
14 While Pierce disagrees with the Trial Court's analysis, such a "breach" by McMullen would entitle Pierce to 
restitution under the theory of an implied-in-law contract claim. 
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para. 11 is clearly erroneous m light of Pierce's testimony and the court's own conflicting 
findings. 
In finding # 12, the court found that the documents presented to Pierce were not 
confusing, misleading or ambiguous. R. p. 159, para. 12. As stated above, whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a matter of law, not fact. Additionally, Pierce testified that the documents were 
confusing to him and that he did not know what they meant. Given the testimony of Pierce, 
together with a review of the documents, it is clear that the documents were confusing, 
misleading, and ambiguous, and were designed to conceal the main goal of the transaction. 
Next, the district court found that Pierce did not prove that the parties had agreed to split 
the profits. R. p. 158-59, paras. 11 and 13. The court made this finding based upon the language 
in the "purchase and sale" agreement, ignoring all the additional uncontroverted evidence that 
was presented to support Pierce's belief The trial court further stated in its analysis that the oral 
statements made by McMullen would otherwise be covered by the statute of frauds, but that 
McMullen did not assert the defense, waiving it. 15 R. p. 141. 
Taking into account Pierce's testimony that McMullen stated that Pierce and McMullen 
were to split the profits after sale of the property (as the trial court correctly notes it is to do at R. 
p. 141), the court should have so found. Rather, the court finds that the statements made by 
McMullan were not corroborated in the Contract for Purchase and Sale or any of the other 
submitted exhibits. R., pp. 159-60, para. 13. While it is true that the documents do not set forth 
the oral provision from McMullen, it is McMullen who drafted the documents and explained 
15 The court admits the defense was waived by McMullen's failure to plead it. Thus, Pierce does not address 
whether the trial court was correct in its assertion, as the issue of the statute of frauds is superfluous to this appeal. 
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their supposed legal effect. It is also McMullen who made the oral representations to Pierce. 
The evidence of McMullen's oral representations is uncontroverted, and McMullen did not deny 
the allegation in Pierce's complaint that Defendants represented that Pierce would receive most 
of his equity, R. p. 88, the conflicting evidence between the documents McMullen drafted for 
Pierce's signature, and his oral representations, should be construed against McMullen. 
Next, the trial court found that Pierce had not proven his contention that McMullen began 
putting pressure on Plaintiff to sign a new deed that transferred all ownership by warranty deed 
from Pierce to the trust, and that should Pierce continue to refuse, McMullen would stop making 
payments on the loans. R. p. 161, para. 20. The district court concluded that no such testimony 
was given by Pierce at trial. R. p. 162. The court is correct. However, Pierce pled the 
contention in his First Amended Complaint. R., p. 89, para. 20. McMullen never denied the 
averment. Both Respondents defaulted, therefore, as discussed above, the averment should be 
taken as true. 
The trial court made a finding in #24, R. p. 162, that Pierce had not proven that 
McMullen continued to owe him $30,000 pursuant to the promissory note executed by 
McMullen. The court's rationale for its finding was that the "maker of the note is unclear." R. 
p. 162. However, Pierce testified he was given a promissory note by McMullen. Tr. p. 63, L. 
16; p. 64, L. 4-6. Pierce further authenticated the promissory note that was admitted as Trial 
Exhibit 6 as being the one signed by McMullen. Tr. p. 63, L. 16-18. Finding of Fact #24 is 
erroneous because it is clear based upon the document and the testimony of Pierce that 
McMullen was the maker of the note. 
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Findings #25, #28 and #29 all relate to Pierce's belief that he would receive one-half of 
the equity upon the sale of the property. R. p. 163. However, just as in finding #13, the district 
court found "no evidence" to support the claim. As stated above, Pierce testified as to the oral 
representations of McMullen. Further, Trial Exhibit 19 makes clear that the equity available in 
the property (based upon the tax assessor's records), was $111,658. Trial Exhibit 19. One-half 
of that amount totals $55,829. 
If the court's finding in #13 is elToneous, then so too must be the findings in #25, #28 and 
#29, as all of these findings relate to McMullen's representations to Pierce that he would receive 
$30,000 plus one-half of the equity after a sale of the property. All of the trial court's above 
findings are clearly erroneous. They lack clear and substantial evidence to support them. In fact, 
the evidence in the record is contrary to the findings made by the district court. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES 
Idaho Code § 48-608(4), provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to a prevailing 
party in an action brought under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, Pierce 
respectfully requests an award of attorney fees and costs in bringing this appeal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the Respondents having defaulted, and two prior rulings by the trial court that 
Pierce prevailed on his claims thus nanowing the issue for trial to damages, the trial court ruled 
against Pierce for failing to prove at trial the averments of his amended complaint. 
Appellant tried his damages case to the court without a jury. The Respondent Highland 
Financial, LLC, was previously defaulted and Respondent Steve McMullen was defaulted and 
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his answer stricken on the first day of trial. The damages case brought before the COUlt was 
related to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, which applies to the mortgage foreclosure rescue 
services offered by Respondents McMullen and Highland Financial to Pierce. As a result of 
McMullen engaging in unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in the context of the transaction 
with Pierce, Pierce suffered an ascertainable loss. The district court's decision should be reversed 
on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLYSUBAflTTED 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 2013, I caused to be served two true and correct 
copies ofthe foregoing Appellant's briefby first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to 
the following: 
Steve McMullen 
P.O. Box 3510 
Post Falls, ID 83877 
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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
CONSUMER INFORMATION 
Mortgage Relief Scams 
The possibility of losing your home to foreclosure can be terrifying. The reality that scam artists are 
preying on desperate homeowners is equally frightening. Many companies say they can get a 
change to your loan that will reduce your monthly mortgage payment or take other steps to save 
your home. Some claim that nearly all their customers get successful results and even offer a 
money-back guarantee. Others say they're affiliated with the government or your lender and still 
others promise the help of attorneys or real estate experts. 
Unfortunately, many companies use half-truths and even outright lies to sell their services. They 
promise relief, but don't deliver. In fact, many of these companies leave their homeowner customers 
in worse financial shape. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation's consumer protection agency, has a Rule in place 
to protect homeowners. The Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS) Rule makes it illegal for 
companies to collect any fees until a homeowner has actually received an offer of relief from his or 
her lender and accepted it. That means even if you agree to have a company help you, you don't 
have to pay until it gets you the result you want. 
If you're struggling to make mortgage payments or facing foreclosure, the FTC wants you to know 
how to recognize a mortgage assistance relief scam and exercise your rights under the new Rule. 
And even if the foreclosure process has already begun, the FTC and its law enforcem ent partners 
want you to know that legitimate options are available to help save your home. 
How the Scams Work 
Fraudsters use a variety of tactics to find homeowners in distress. Some sift through public 
foreclosure notices in newspapers and on the internet or through public files at local government 
offices, and then send personalized letters to homeowners. Others take a broader approach through 
ads on the internet, on television or radio, or in newspapers; posters on telephone poles, median 
strips, and at bus stops; or flyers, business cards, or people at your front door. The scam artists use 
simple - but potentially deceptive - messages, like: 
"Stop foreclosure now!" 
"Get a loan modification!" 
"Over 90% of our customers get results." 
"We have special relationships with banks that can speed up the approval process." 
"100% Money Back Guarantee." 
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"Keep Your Home. We know your home is scheduled to be sold. No Problem!" 
Once they have your attention, they use a variety of tactics to get your money. By knowing how their 
scams work, the FTC says you'll be better able to defend against fraud. 
Phony Counseling or Phantom Help 
The scam artists tell you that if you pay them a fee, they'll negotiate a deal with your lender to 
reduce your mortgage payments or to save your home. They may claim to be attorneys or represent 
a law firm. They may tell you not to contact your lender, lawyer, or credit counselor. They promise to 
handle all the details once you pay them a fee. Then they stop returning your calls and take off with 
your money. 
Sometimes, phony counselors insist you make your mortgage payments directly to them while they 
negotiate with the lender. They may collect a few months of payments - and then disappear. 
The "Forensic Audit" 
In exchange for an upfront fee, so-called forensic loan "auditors," mortgage loan "auditors," or 
foreclosure prevention "auditors" offer to have an attorney or other expert review your mortgage 
documents to determine if your lender complied with the law. The "auditors" say you can use their 
report to avoid foreclosure, speed the loan modification process, reduce what you owe, or even 
cancel your loan. In fact, there's no evidence that forensic loan audits will help you get a loan 
modification or any other mortgage relief. 
Rent-to-Buy Schemes 
Con artists who use the rent-to-buy scheme tell you to surrender the title to your house as part of a 
deal that allows you to stay there as a renter and buy it back later. They say that surrendering the 
title will let a borrower with a better credit rating get new financing and prevent the loss of the hom e. 
But the terms of these deals usually are so expensive that buying back your home becomes 
impossible. You lose the house and the scam artist walks off with the money you put into it. Worse, 
when the new borrower defaults on the loan, you're the one who's evicted. 
In a variation, the scam artist raises the rent over time so you can't afford it. After missing several 
rent payments, you're evicted, leaving the "rescuer" free to sell the house. 
In a similar equity-skimming scam, fraudsters offer to find a buyer for your home, but only if you sign 
over the deed and move out. They promise to pay you a portion of the profit when the home sells. 
Once you transfer the deed, they simply rent out the home and pocket the proceeds while your 
lender goes ahead with the foreclosure. The result: You lose your home - and you're still responsible 
for the unpaid mortgage because transferring the deed does nothing to transfer what you owe on the 
mortgage. 
Bait-and-Switch 
In a bait-and-switch scam, con artists give you papers they claim you need to sign to get another 
loan to make your mortgage current. But buried in the stack is a document that surrenders the title 
to your house to the scammers in exchange for a "rescue" loan. 
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Know your Rights 
The FTC's MARS Rule gives you rights - and sets out requirements for people who sell mortgage 
assistance relief services: 
You don't have to pay any money until the company delivers the results you want. 
It's illegal for a company to charge you a penny until: 
1. it's given you a written offer for a loan modification or other relief from your lender; and 
2. you accept the offer. The company also must give you a document from your lender showing 
the changes to your loan if you decide to accept your lender's offer. And the company must 
clearly tell you the total fee it will charge you for its services. 
Companies must disclose key information. 
The Rule requires companies to spell out important information in their advertisements and 
telemarketing calls, including that: 
.. They're not associated with the government, and their services have not been approved by 
the government or your lender; 
.. Your lender may not agree to change your loan; 
.. If a company tells you to stop paying your mortgage, it also has to warn you that doing so 
could result in your losing your home and damaging your credit. 
.. Companies can't tell you to stop talking to your lender. You should always feel free to 
contact your lender directly to see whether they can offer you additional options. 
Companies that tell you otherwise are breaking the law. 
If a company doesn't follow these rules, it could be trying to scam you. 
Getting Help from a Lawyer 
Some lawyers may offer to help you get a loan modification or other mortgage relief. Under the 
MARS Rule, lawyers can require you to pay an upfront fee, but only if: 
• They're licensed to practice law in the state where you live or your house is located; 
• They're providing you with real legal services; 
.. They're complying with state ethics requirements for attorneys; and 
.. They place the money in a client trust account, withdraw fees only as they complete actual 
legal services, and notify you of each withdrawal. 
Unfortunately, some people advertising mortgage assistance relief services falsely claim to be getting 
you help from lawyers. So before you hire someone who claims to be an attorney or claims to work 
with attorneys, do your homework: 
Get the name of each attorney who'll be helping you, the state or states where the attorney is 
licensed, and the attorney's license number in each state. Your state has a licensing organization-
or "bar" - that monitors attorney conduct. Call your state bar or check its website to see if an 
attorney you're thinking of hiring has gotten into trouble. The National Organization of Bar Counsel 
has links to your state bar. 
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Ask relatives, friends, and others you trust for the name of an attorney with a proven record of getting 
help for homeowners facing foreclosure. 
Beware of attorneys who make bold promises or try to pressure you into hiring them. 
Warning Signs 
If you're looking for a loan modification or other help to save your home, avoid any business that: 
.. guarantees to get you a loan modification or stop the foreclosure process - no matter what 
your circumstances; 
.. tells you not to contact your lender, lawyer, or housing counselor; 
" claims that all or most of its customers get loan modifications or mortgage relief; 
" asks for an upfront fee before providing you with any services (unless it's a lawyer you've 
checked out thoroughly); 
" accepts payment only by cashier's check or wire transfer; 
.. encourages you to lease your home so you can buy it back over time; 
.. tells you to make your mortgage payments directly to it, rather than your lender; 
.. tells you to transfer your property deed or title to it; 
.. offers to buy your house for cash for much lower than the selling price of similar houses in 
your neighborhood; or 
.. pressures you to sign papers you haven't had a chance to read thoroughly or that you don't 
understand. 
Where to Find Legitimate Help 
If you're having trouble paying your mortgage or have gotten a foreclosure notice, contact your lender 
immediately. You may be able to negotiate a new repayment schedule. 
Consider other foreclosure prevention options, including reinstatement and forbearance. 
You also may contact a credit counselor through the Homeownership Preservation Foundation 
(HPF), a nonprofit organization that operates the national 24/7 toli-free hotline (1.888.995.HOPE) 
with free, bilingual, personalized assistance to help at-risk homeowners avoid foreclosure. HPF is a 
member of the HOPE NOW Alliance of mortgage servicers, mortgage market participants and 
counselors. 
Report Fraud 
If you think you've been the victim of foreclosure fraud, contact the Federal Trade Commission, your 
state Attorney General's office. or the Better Business Bureau. 
May 2012 
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APPENDIXB 
Federal Trade Commission District Court Cases cited herein. 
1. FTC v. Federal Loan Modification Law Center, LLP et al., SA-CV-09-401-CJC 
(MLGx), (U.S. Dist. Ct., Central Dist. Cal. 2010) 
2. FTC v. Home Assure, LLC, et at:, 8:09-cv-547-T-23TBM (Dist. Ct. Middle Dist. Fl., 
Tampa Division) 
3. FTC v. Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, et al., 1 :08-cv-I075 (Dist. Ct. N. Dist. Ohio, Eastern 
Division) 
4. FTC v. Loss Mitigation Services, Inc., et al.,09-CV-800 (U.S Dist. Ct. Ctrl Dist. of Cal.) 
5. FTC v. United Home Savers, LLP, et ai., 8:08-cv-01735-VMC-TBM (U.S. Dist. Ct. Mid. 
Dist. Fl.) 28 
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1trROPOSEDlDEFAULT 
)J1JDGE~IENT .. <\ND ORDER )AS TO DEFENDANTS FEDERI\.L 
~LOAN l\10DIFICATIONS, LEGAL TL~INC. FEDERALLO .. 4..N l\10DIiffCATION, LLC, SBSC )CORPORATION )LEGAL TL~.: L'LC .. 4ND RELIEF )DEFENDANT 1\1GO C .. 4..PITAL 
i ~JUdge: HOIl. Comlac J. Camey 
1 
1 
26 Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission CFTC") commenced this civil action on 
27 April 3, 2009, pursuant to Section l3(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. § 53(b), to obt'lin 
28 preliminary and permanent injllllctive and other equitable relief for Defendants' 
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1 violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, IS U.S.C. § 45, in c01U1ection with the 
2 marketing and sale of mortgage loan modification and foreclosure relief services. 
3 The FTC subsequently filed a First i\mended Complaint on June 24, 2009, naming 
4 Defendants Federal Loan :tvfodifications, SBSC Corporation, and Venture Legal 
5 Support, PLC and Relief Defendants Legal T1ml, LLC and lvlGO Capital, and a 
6 Second Amended Complaint on October 1, 201 0, naming LegalTurn, LLC as a 
7 Defendant, and removing that company as a Relief DefendanL The Comt entered a 
8 Preliminary Inj1Ulction Order CPI Order") in this case enjoining Defendants from, 
9 among other things, collecting advance fees from consumers, from making certain 
10 representations about their services, and from disposing of assets outside the 
11 ordinary course of business. On September 14, 2009, the Court entered default 
12 against Defendants LegalTurn, Inc., Federal LoanJ:vlodification, LLC, SBSC 
13 Corporation, and Relief Defendant IvfGO Capital for their failure to defend. The 
14 Court subsequently entered default against Defendant Federal Loan1vfodifications on 
15 September 7, 2010, and against Defendant Legal Turn, LLC on November IS, 2010. 
16 The FTC has moved for default judgment on all COlUltS of the Second 
17 Amended Complaint against Defendant') LegalT1ml, Inc., Federal Loan 
18 Ivfodification, LLC, SBSC Corporation, Federal Loan :tvfodifications, Legal T1ml, 
19 LLC, and Relief Defendant IvfGO Capital pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules 
20 of Civil Procedure. The FTC's lv10tion for Default Judgment against Defendant') is 
21 GRANTED, and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows: 
22 FINDINGS 
23 After consideration of the FTCs :tvIotion for Default Judgment, the Court finds: 
24 1. This is an action by the FTC brought pursuant to Sections 5 and 1 3 (b) 
25 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 45 and 57(b). The Second .Amended Complaint seeks 
26 both permanent iI~j1Ulctive relief and conSlUl1er redress for the Defendants' alleged 
27 deceptive acts or practices in c01U1ection \vith the marketing and sale of mortgage 
28 loan modification and foreclosure relief services. 
2 
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1 2. The FTC has authority lUlder Sections 13(b) of the FTC Act to seek the 
2 relief it has requested, and the Second i\mended Complaint states a claim upon 
3 v;lhich relief can be granted against Defendants LegalTlU11, Inc., Federal Loan 
4 lviodification, LLC, SBSC Corporation, Federal Loan lv[odifications, Legal TlU11, 
5 LLC, and Relief Defendant IvIGO Capital. 
6 3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 
7 1331, 1337(a) and 1345, and 15 U.S.c. §§ 45(a) and 53(b) and has jurisdiction over 
8 Defendants and Relief Defendant. Venue in the Central District of Califomia is 
9 proper. 
10 4. The activities of Defendants LegalTlU11, Inc., Federal Loan 
11 lviodification, LLC, SBSC Corporation, Federal Loan l'vfodifications, and Legal TlU11, 
12 LLC, as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, are in or affecting commerce, as 
13 defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
14 5. The factual allegations in the FTC's SecondA.mended Complaint are 
15 taken as tnle against Defendants. Those allegations and the evidence supporting 
16 them establish that Defendants violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. 
1'7 § 45(a), which prohibits lUlfair and deceptive act') or practices in or atTecting 
18 commerce. 
19 6. Defendants, in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, 
20 otTering for sale, and sale of mortgage loan modification services, violated Section 
21 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45(a) by making false and misleading statement') to 
22 induce consumers to purchase these services, including but not limited to the 
23 representations that Defendants would obtain loan modifications for consumers in all 
24 or virtually all cases and that Defendants were part of, affiliated \vith, or endorsed by 
25 the United States Govemment or one or more federal government programs. 
26 7. Defendants have operated as a common enterprise in engaging in 
27 deceptive acts and practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. Defendants 
28 share or have shared office space and employees, are commonly controlled, 
3 
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1 commingle or have commingled il.mds, and have participated in a common scheme to 
2 deceive consmners. Because Defendants have operated as a common enterprise, 
3 each of them is jointly and severally liable for the acts and practices alleged in the 
4 FTC's Second i\mended Complaint. 
5 8. Relief Defendant NrGO Capital has received tlUlds and other property 
6 that were derived unlawilllly from payments by COll."RUners as a COll.'3equence of the 
7 acts and practices alleged in the FTC's Second Amended Complaint, and does not 
8 have a legitimate claim to those flUlds. 
9 9. This action and the relief awarded herein, are in addition to, and not in 
10 lieu of, other remedies as may be provided by law, including both civil and criminal 
11 remedies. 
12 10. Entry of this Order is in the public interest. 
13 11. Entry of this Order resolves the FTC's action against Defendants and 
14 Relief Defendant, and there is no just reason for delay in certifying this Order as 
15 final. Therefore, the FTC is entitled to entry of this judgment now pursuant to Rule 
16 54(b). 
17 DEF1NITIONS 
18 For the purposes of this Order, the following definitions shall apply: 
19 1. "Defendants" mean LegalTurn, Inc., Federal Loan IV[odification, LLC, 
20 SBSC Corporation, Federal Loan 110difications, and Legal Tlml, LLC. 
21 'iReliefDefendantlJ memlS 11GO Capital. 
22 3. tiperson" memlS a natural person, organization, or other legal entity, 
23 including a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, association, cooperative, or any 
24 other group or combination acting as an entity. 
25 4. "Serdcer" means any beneficiary, mortgagee, trustee, loan servicer, 
26 loml holder, or any entity performing loan or credit accOlUlt achninistration or 
27 processing services and/or its authorized agents. 
28 5. (~4ssisting others" includes, but is not limited to, providing any of the 
4 
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1 following goods or services to another person: (A) performing customer service 
2 flll1Ctions, including, but not limited to, receiving or responding to consumer 
3 complaints; (B) formulating or providing, or arranging for the formulation or 
4 provision of, any telephone sales script or any other marketing material, including 
5 but not limited to, the text of any Intemet website, email, or other electronic 
6 commlll1ication~ (C) providing names of, or assisting in the generation of, potential 
7 customers; (D) perfonning marketing services of any kind; or (E) acting or serving 
8 as an owner, otlicer, director, manager, or principal of any entity. 
9 6. "ll1aterialfact" means any t~lCt that is likely to affect a person's choice 
10 o( or conduct regarding, goods or services. 
11 7. uFor-profit" means any activity organized to carry on business for the 
12 profit of the entity engaging in the activity or that of its m em bers. 
13 8. HCredit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer 
14 payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment. 
15 9. ilAilvance-fee loan'" means any good service, plan, or program that is 
16 represented, expressly or by implication, to provide any conS1U11er, arrange for any 
17 consmner to receive, or assist any consmner in receiving, a loan or other extension of 
18 credit, in exchange for payment of any fee or other consideration in advance of the 
19 consmner receiving the represented loan or other extension of credit 
20 10. "Credit repair good or serl'ice" mean.') any good, service, plan or 
21 program represented, expressly or by implication, to (A) improve, or arrange to 
22 improve, any consmner's credit record, credit history, or credit rating, or (B) provide 
23 advice or assistance to cUlY consmner \vith regard to any activity or service the 
24 purpose of which is to improve a consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit 
25 rating. 
26 11. "Debt relief good or service" means any good, service, plan or 
27 program, including debt management plans, debt settlement, debt negotiation, and 
28 for-profit credit cOlUlseling, represented, expressly or by implication, to renegotiate, 
5 
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1 settle, or in any way alter the tenns of payment or other terms of any secured or 
') unsecured debt, including but not limited to credit card, medical, vehicle loan, and 
3 tax debt, between a consmner and one or more creditors, servicers, or debt collectors, 
4 including but not limited to, a reduction in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed by 
5 a consmner to a creditor, servicer, or debt collector. 
6 12. <illlortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service" means any 
7 good, service, plan, or program that is represented, expressly or by implication, to 
8 assist a consumer in any maImer to (A) stop, prevent, or postpone any home 
9 mortgage or deed oftmst foreclosure sale; (8) obtain or arrange a modification of 
10 any tenn of a home loan, deed of tnlst, or mortgage; (C) obtain any forbearance from 
11 any mortgage loan holder or servicer; (D) exercise any right of reinstatement of any 
12 mortgage loan; (E) obtain, arrange, or attempt to obtain or ammge any extension of 
13 the period within which the owner of property sold at foreclosure may cure his or 
14 her default or reinstate his or her obligation; (F) obtain any \vaiver of an acceleration 
15 clause contained in any promissory note or contract secured by a deed of tnlst or 
16 mortgage on a residence in foreclosure or contained in that deed of tmst; (G) obtain a 
17 loan or advance of funds that is connected to the consumer's home O\vnership; (H) 
18 avoid or ameliorate the impairment of the COnSl.U11er'S credit record, credit history, or 
19 credit rating that is cOlmected to the consmner's home O\vnership; (I) save the 
20 consmuer's residence from foreclosure; (J) assist the consumer in obtaining proceeds 
21 from the foreclosure sale of the COI1Smner's residence; (K) obtain or arrange a 
22 pre-foreclosure sale, short sale, or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; (L) obtain or arrange a 
23 refinancing, recapitalization, or reinstatement of a home loan, deed of tmst, or 
24 mortgage; (1v1) audit or examine a consmner's mortgage or home loan application; or 
25 (N) obtain, arrange, or attempt to obtain or arrange any extension of the period 
26 within \vhich the renter of property sold at foreclosure may continue to occupy the 
27 property. The foregoing shall include any manner of claimed assistance, including, 
28 but not limited to, debt, credit, budget, or financial counseling; receiving money for 
6 
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1 the purpose of distributing it to creditors~ contacting creditors or servicers on behalf 
,., of the conSU1l1er~ and giving advice of any kind vvith respect to filing for bankruptcy. 
3 13. UFederal homeol1'lzer relief orfinancial stability program" means any 
4 program (including it~ sponsoring agencies, telephone num bers, and Intenlet 
5 websites) operated or endorsed by the United States govemment to provide relief to 
6 homeovvners or stabilize the economy, including but not limited to (A) the J:v[aking 
7 Home Affordable Program; (B) the Financial Stability Plan; (C) the Troubled Asset 
8 Relief Program and any other program sponsored or operated by the United States 
9 Department of the Treasury: (D) the HOPE for HomeO\vners program, any program 
10 operated or created pursuant to the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, and any 
11 other program sponsored or operated by the Federal Housing Administration; or (E) 
12 any program sponsored or operated by the United States Department of Housing and 
13 Urban Development ("HUD''), the HOPE NO\V Alliance, the Homeownership 






B~;\N ON l\fORTGAGE LOAN 1\,fODIFICATION AND FORECLOSURE 
RELIEF SERVICES 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants, whether acting directly or 
19 through any other person, are permanently restrained and enjoined from 
20 A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any 
21 mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service; and 
22 B. Assisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting, offering 
23 for sale, or selling any mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service. 
24 BAN ON DEBT RELIEF AND CERTAIN OTHER FINANCIAL-RELATED 
25 GOODS AND SERVICES 
26 II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, whether acting directly or 
27 through any other person, are permanentlyT restrained and enjoined from: 
28 A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, and or selling any 
7 
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1 debt relief good or service, credit repair good or service, advance fee loan, or any 
') credit, debit, or stored value card, including pre-paid calling cards~ or 
3 B. Assisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting, offering 
4 for sale, or selling of any debt relief good or service, credit repair good or service, 
5 advance fee loan, or any credit, debit, or stored value card, including pre-paid calling 
6 cards. 
7 PROIDBITED REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO ANY GOODS OR 
8 SERVICES 
9 III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants and their successors, assigns, 
10 officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons or entities in 
11 active concert or participation \vith any of them \vho receive actual notice of this 
12 Order by personal service, facsimile transmission, email, or otherwise, whether 
13 acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in 
14 cOlmection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale or sale of 
15 any good, service, plan, or program, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined 
16 from misrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, expressly or by 
17 implication, any material fact, including but not limited to: 
18 A. Any material aspect of the nature or terms of any reflUld, cancellation, 
19 exchange, or repurchase policy, including, but not limited to, the likelihood of a 
20 COnS1.Ul1er obtaining a full or partial refund, or the circumstances in which a full or 
21 partial reflUld will be granted to the COnS1.Uller: 
22 B. That any person is affiliated with, endorsed or approved by, or 
23 othenvise connected to any other person, goven1l11ent entity, any federal homemvner 
24 relief or financial stability program, or any other program; 
25 C. The total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, the good 
26 or serVIce; 
27 D. Any material restriction, limitation, or condition to purchase, receive, or 
28 use the good or senlice; and 
8 
1 
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E. l\ny material aspect of the perfonnance, efficacy, nature, or 
2 characteristics of the good or service. 
3 lVIONETARY RELIEF 
4 IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
5 A. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendants, jointly and severally, in 
6 the amotmt of ten million three-hundred ninety-seven thousand two-hundred sixty 
7 dollars ($10,397,260). This amotmt shall become immediately due and payable by 
8 Defendants upon entry of this Order, and interest computed at the rate prescribed 
9 lmder 28 U.S.c. § 196L as amended, shall immediately begin to accnle on the 
10 unpaid balance; 
11 B. Judgment is hereby entered against Relief Defendant 1vfGO Capital in 
12 the amotmt of two hundred thirteen thousand seven hundred thirty-seven dollars 
13 ($213,737). 
14 c. .A.ny funds received by the FTC pursuant to this Section shall be 
15 deposited into a tlmd achninistered by the FTC or its agent to be used for equitable 
16 reliet: including but not limited to conSlUner redress and any attendant expenses for 
17 the administration of any redress tlmds. In the event that direct redress to conSlUn ers 
18 is wholly or partially impracticable or tlmds remain after redress is completed, the 
19 FTC may apply any remaining funds for such other equitable relief, including but not 
20 limited to conSlUl1er infonnation remedies, as the FTC detennines to be reasonably 
21 related to the practices alleged in the Amended Complaint. i\ny tlmds not used for 
')') such equitable relief shall be deposited to the U.S. Treasury as equitable 
23 disgorgement. Defendants shall have no right to challenge the FTC's choice of 
24 remedies or the manner of distribution. 
25 D. The judgm ent entered pursuant to this Section is equitable monetary 
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E. Pursuant to Section 604(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 
') § 1681 b(1), any consumer reporting agency may ilrrnish a consumer report 
3 concerning Defendants to the FTC, which shall be used for purposes of collecting 
4 and reporting on any delinquent am OlUlt arising out of this Order. 
5 RETENTION OF JURISDICTION 
6 V. IT IS F1JRTHER ORDERED that this COlrrt shall retain jlrrisdiction of this 






















IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of December, 2010 
Conl1ac J. Canley 
United States District Judge 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TAMPA DIVISION 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO.: 8:09-cv-547-T-23TBM v. 




The parties jointly move (Doc. 272) for an order (1) re-opening this action, 
(2) vacating the Clerk's default (Doc. 93) against Home Assure, (3) entering the parties' 
"Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction" (Doc. 272-1) against 
Home Assure. A May 10, 2010, order (1) stays and administratively closes this case 
pending the commissioners' approval of the parties' settlement and (2) permits the 
parties to seek the re-opening of this action within ninety days. Counsel for the 
defendants Nicolas Molina and Michael Trimarco enters an appearance (Doc. 271) on 
behalf of Home Assure. After the re-opening of this action and entry of the stipulated 
final Judgment as to Home Assure, the Commission intends (1) to seek a default 
judgment against the defendant B Home Associates, LLC, and (2) to stipulate to the 
voluntary dismissal with prejudice of this action as to the remaining Individual 
defendants. 
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The motion (Doc. 272) is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to RE-OPEN this 
action. The Clerk's default against Home Assure (Doc. 93) is VACATED. The following 
"stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief Against 
Defendant Home Assure, LLC," (Doc. 272-1) is APPROVED. 
Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief 
Against Defendant Home Assure, LLC 
This action by the Commission is instituted under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Pursuantto this statute, the Commission has the authority to seek 
the relief contained herein. 
1. This COUlt has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 
2. Venue in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida is proper 
as to all parties. 
3. The Complaint states a claim against Home Assure upon which relief may be 
granted under Sections 5(a) and 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 
53(b). 
4. The activities of Defendant Home Assure are orwere in or affecting commerce, 
as defined by Section 4 ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
5. Defendant Home Assure has waived any and all rights that may arise under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, concerning the prosecution of this 
action through the date of entry of this Order. 
6. This Order Is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other civil or criminal remedies 
that may be provided by law. 
-2-
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7. This Order is remedial in nature and shall not be construed as the payment of a 
fine, penalty, punitive assessment, or forfeiture. 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant Home Assure waive all rights to seek appellate review or 
otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Order. Defendant Home Assure 
further waives and releases any claim it may have against the Commission, its 
employees, agents, and representatives. 
9. Entry of this Order is in the public interest. 
10. This Order is for settlement purposes only, and does not constitute and shall not 
be interpreted to constitute an admission by Defendant Home Assure or a finding 
that the law has been violated as alleged in the Complaint, orthat the facts 
alleged in the Complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. "Asset" or "assets" means any legal or equitable interest in, right to, or claim to, 
any real and personal property, including, but not limited to, "goods," 
"instruments," "eqUipment," "fixtures," "general intangibles," "inventory," "checks," 
and "notes" (as these terms are defined in the Uniform Commercial Code). and all 
chattel, leaseholds, contracts, mail or other deliveries, shares of stock, lists of 
consumer names, accounts, credits, receivables, funds, reserve funds, and cash, 
wherever located. 
2. "Assisting others" includes, but is not limited to (A) performing customer 
service functions, including, but not limited to, receiving or responding to 
consumer complaints; (B) formulating or providing, or arranging for the 
-3-
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formulation or provision of, any telephone sales script or other marketing material, 
including, but not limited to, the text of any Internet website, email or other 
electronic communication; (C) providing names of, or assisting in the generation 
of lists of, potential customers; (D) performing marketing services of any kind; (E) 
processing credit and debit card payments; (F) hiring, recruiting, or training 
personnel; (G) advising or acting as a consultant to others on the commencement 
or management of a business venture; or (H) acting or serving as an owner, 
officer, director, manager, or principal of any entity. 
3. "Credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of 
debt or to incur debt and defer its payment. 
4. "Debt relief good or service" means any good, service, plan, or program, 
including debt management plans, debt settlement, debt negotiation, and for-profit 
credit counseling, represented, expressly or by implication, to renegotiate, settle, 
or in any way alter the terms of payment or other terms of the debt between a 
consumer and one or more unsecured creditors, servicers, or debt collectors, 
including but not limited to, a reduction in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed 
by a consumer to an unsecured creditor, servicer, or debt collector. 
5. "Document" is synonymous in meaning and equal in scope to the usage of the 
term in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), and includes both documents and 
electronically stored information, including, but not limited to, writings, drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, audio and video recordings, computer records, and 
other data compilations from which information can be obtained and translated, if 
-4-
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necessary, through detection devices into reasonably usable form. A draft or 
non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of the term 
"document." 
6. "Federal homeowner relief or financial stability program" means any program 
(including its sponsoring agencies, telephone numbers, and Internet websites) 
operated or endorsed by the United States government to provide relief to 
homeowners or stabilize the economy, including but not limited to (A) the Making 
Home Affordable Program; (8) the Financial Stability Plan; (C) the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program and any other program sponsored or operated by the United 
States Department ofthe Treasury; (D) the HOPE for Homeowners program, any 
program operated or created pursuant to the Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act, and any other program sponsored or operated by the Federal Housing 
Administration; or (E) any program sponsored or operated by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("Huon), the HOPE NOW 
Alliance, the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, or any other HUD-
approved housing counseling agency. 
7. "Financial Related Good or Service" means any good, service, plan, or 
program that is represented, expressly or by implication, to (A) provide any 
consumer, arrange for any consumer to receive, or assist any consumer in 
receiving, credit, debit, or stored value cards; (8) improve, or arrange to improve, 
any consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating; (C) provide advice or 
assistance to any consumer with regard to any activity or service the purpose of 
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which is to improve a consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating; (D) 
provide any consumer, arrange for any consumer to receive, or assist any 
consumer in receiving, a loan or other extension of credit; (E) provide any 
consumer, arrange for any consumer to receive, or assist any consumer in 
receiving, debt relief goods or services; or (F) provide any consumer, arrange for 
any consumer to receive, or assist any consumer in receiving any service 
represented, expressly or by implication, to renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter 
the terms of payment or other terms of the debt between a consumer and one or 
more secured creditors, servicers, or debt collectors. 
8. "For-profit" means any activity organized to carryon business for the profit of 
the entity engaging in the activity or that of its members. 
9. "Mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service" means any good, 
service, plan, or program that is represented, expressly or by implication, to assist 
a consumer in any manner to (A) stop, prevent, or postpone any home mortgage 
or deed of trust foreclosure sale; (B) obtain or arrange a modification of any term 
of a home loan, deed of trust, or mortgage; (C) obtain any forbearance from any 
mortgage loan holder or servicer; (D) exercise any right of reinstatement of any 
mortgage loan; (E) obtain, arrange, or attempt to obtain or arrange any extension 
of the period within which the owner of property sold at foreclosure may cure his 
or her default or reinstate his or her obligation; (F) obtain any waiver of an 
acceleration clause contained in any promissory note or contract secured by a 
deed of trust or mortgage on a residence in foreclosure or contained in that deed 
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of trust; (G) obtai n a loa n or advance offunds that is connected to the consumer's 
home ownership; (H) avoid or ameliorate the impairment of the consumer's credit 
record, credit history, or credit rating that is connected to the consumer's home 
ownership; (I) save the consumer's residence from foreclosure; (J) assist the 
consumer in obtaining proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the consumer's 
residence; (K) obtain or arrange a pre-foreclosure sale, short sale, or deed-in-lieu 
of foreclosure; (L) obtain or arrange a refinancing, recapitalization, or 
reinstatement of a home loan, deed of trust, or mortgage; (M) audit or examine a 
consumer's mortgage or home loan application; or (N) obtain, arrange, or attempt 
to obtain or arrange any extension of the period within which the renter of 
property sold at foreclosure may continue to occupy the property. The foregoing 
shall include any manner of claimed assistance, including, but not limited to, debt, 
credit, budget, or financial counseling: receiving money for the purpose of 
distributing it to creditors; contacting creditors or servicers on behalf of the 
consumer; and giving advice of any kind with respect to filing for bankruptcy. 
10. "Material" means any fact that is likely to affect a person's choice of, or conduct 
regarding, any good, service, plan, or program. 
11. "Person" means a natural person, an organization, or other legal entity, including 
a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, limited liability company, 
association, cooperative, or any other group or combination acting as an entity. 
-7-
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12. The terms "and" and "or" shall be construed conjunctively or disjunctively as 
necessary, and to make the applicable phrase or sentence inclusive rather than 
exclusive. 
I. BAN ON LOAN MODIFICATION AND FORECLOSURE RELIEF SERVICES 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Home Assure and its successors and 
assigns, whether acting directly or through any other person, corporation, partnership, 
subsidiary, division, or other device, is permanently restrained and enjoined from 
A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any mortgage 
loan modification or foreclosure relief service; and 
B. Assisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for 
sale, or selling any mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service. 
II. PROHIBITED REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO FINANCIAL RELATED 
GOODS AND SERVICES 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Home Assure, and its successors 
and assigns, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those 
persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual 
notice of this Order by personal service, facsimile transmission, email, or otherwise, 
whether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, 
in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale or sale of any 
financial related good or service, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from: 
A. Misrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, expressly or by 
implication, any material fact, including but not limited to: 
-8-
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1. The terms or rates that are available for any loan or other extension 
of credit, including but not limited to: 
(a) closing costs or other fees; 
(b) the payment schedule, the monthly payment amount(s), or 
other paymentterms, or whether there is a balloon payment; interest rate(s), annual 
percentage rate(s), or finance charge; the loan amount, the amount of credit, the draw 
amount, or outstanding balance; the loan term, the draw period, or maturity; or any 
other term of credit; 
(c) the savings associated with the credit; 
(d) the amount of cash to be disbursed to the borrower out of the 
proceeds, or the amount of cash to be disbursed on behalf of the borrower to any third 
parties; 
(e) whether the payment of the minimum amount specified each 
month covers both interest and principal, and whether the credit has or can result in 
negative amortization; 
(f) that the credit does not have a prepayment penalty or that no 
prepayment penalty andlor other fees or costs will be incurred if the consumer 
subsequently refinances; and 
(g) that the interest rate(s) or annual percentage rate(s) are fixed 
rather than adjustable or adjustable rather than fixed; 
2. That any person can improve any consumer's credit record, credit 
history, or credit rating by permanently removing negative information from the 
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consumer's credit record, credit history, or credit rating, even where such information is 
accurate and not obsolete; 
3. Any person's ability to improve or otherwise affect a consumer's 
credit record, credit history, or credit rating or ability to obtain credit; 
4. Any aspect of any debt relief good or service, including but not limited 
to, the amount of savings a consumer will receive from purchasing, using, or enrolling in 
such debt relief good or service; the amount of time before which a consumer will 
receive settlement of the consumer's debts; or the reduction or cessation of collection 
calls; and 
5. That a consumer wi" receive legal representation; and 
B. Advertising or assisting others in advertising credit terms other than those 
terms that actually are or will be arranged or offered by a creditor or lender. 
III. PROHIBITED REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO ANY GOODS OR SERVICES 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Home Assure, and its successors 
and assigns, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those 
persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual 
notice of this Order by personal service, facsimile transmission, email, or otherwise, 
whether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, 
in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale or sale of any 
good, service, plan, or program are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from 
misrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, expressly or by implication, any 
material fact, including but not limited to: 
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A. Any material aspect of the nature or terms of any refund, cancellation, 
exchange, or repurchase policy, including, but not limited to, the likelihood of a 
consumer obtaining a full or partial refund, or the circumstances in which a full or partial 
refund will be granted to the consumer; 
B. That any person is affiliated with, endorsed or approved by, or otherwise 
connected to any other person, government entity, any federal homeowner relief or 
financial stability program, or any other program; 
C. The total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, the good 
or service; 
D. Any material restriction, limitation, or condition to purchase, receiVe, or use 
the good or service; and 
E. Any material aspect of the performance, efficacy, nature, or characteristics 
of the good or service. 
IV. MONETARY JUDGMENT 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
A. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant Home Assure in the amount 
of $2,400,000 (Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars) as equitable monetary 
relief. Within ten (10) days ofthe Commission's approval of this Order, Defendant 
Home Assure shall transfer the Monetary Judgment to its attorney, who shall hold the 
entire sum for no other purpose than payment to the Federal Trade Commission after 
entry of this Order. Within five (5) days receipt of notice of the entry of this Order, 
Defendant Home Assure's attorney shall wire transfer the Monetary Judgment to the 
- 11 -
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Federal Trade Commission, in accordance with instructions provided by a 
representative of the Commission. 
B. In the event of Defendant Home Assure's default on any obligation to make 
payment under this Order, interest, computed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), shall 
accrue from the date of default to the date of payment, and shall immediately become 
due and payable. In the event such default continues for ten (10) calendar days beyond 
the date the payment is due, the entire amount of the judgment, less any amounts 
previously paid pursuant to this order, together with interest, shall immediately become 
due and payable. 
C. A" funds paid pursuant to this Order shall be deposited into a fund 
administered by the Commission or its agents to be used for equitable relief, including, 
but not limited to, redress to consumers, and any attendant expenses for the 
administration of such equitable relief. In the event that direct redress to consumers is 
wholly or partially impracticable or funds remain after the redress is completed, the 
Commission may apply any remaining funds for such other equitable relief (including 
consumer information remedies) as it determines to be reasonably related to Defendant 
Home Assure's practices alleged in the Complaint. Any funds not used for such 
equitable relief shall be deposited to the United states Treasury as disgorgement 
Defendant Home Assure shall have no right to challenge the Commission's choice of 
remedies under this Paragraph. Defendant Home Assure shall have no right to contest 
the manner of distribution chosen by the Commission. 
- 12-
" Case B:09-cv-00547-SDM-TBM Document273 Filed 07/29/10 Page 13 of 21 
D. No portion of any payment under the Judgment herein shall be deemed a 
payment of any fine, penalty, or punitive assessment. 
E. Defendant Home Assure relinquishes all dominion, control, and title to the 
funds paid to the fullest extent permitted by law. Defendant shall make no claim to or 
demand for return of the funds, directly or indirectly, through counselor otherwise. 
F. Defendant Home Assure agrees that the facts as alleged in the Complaint 
filed in this action shall be taken as true without further proof in any bankruptcy case or 
subsequent civil litigation pursued by the Commission to enforce its rights to any 
payment or money judgment pursuant to this Order, including, but not limited to, a 
nondischargeability complaint in any bankruptcy case. Defendant further stipulates and 
agrees that the facts alleged in the Complaint establish all elements necessary to 
sustain an action by the Commission pursuant to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), and this Order shall have collateral estoppel effect for 
such purposes. 
G. In accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 7701, Defendant Home Assure is hereby 
required, unless it has already, to furnish to tile Commission its taxpayer identifying 
number(s), which shall be used for the purposes of collecting and reporting on any 
delinquent amount arising out of Defenclant's relationship with the government. 
V. LIFTING OF THE ASSET FREEZE 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED thatthe assetfreeze set forth in the Preliminary 
Injunction, entered by this Court on April 16, 2009 shall be lifted to the extent necessary 
to turn over Defendant Home Assure's assets as required by Section IV.A of this Order, 
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and upon completion of the turn-over as required by Section IV.A of this Order, shall be 
clissolved and lifted permanently. 
VI. ORDER PROVISION REGARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Home Assure, and its successors 
and assigns, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all 
other persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual 
notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, are permanently restrained and 
enjoined from: 
A. Disclosing, using, or benefitting from customer information, including the 
name, address, telephone number, email address, social security number, other 
identifying information, or any data that enables access to a customer's account 
(including a credit card, bank account, or other financial account), of any person which 
any Defendant obtained prior to entry ofthis Order in connection with Defendant Home 
Assure's mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service; and 
B. Failing to dispose of such customer information in all forms in their 
possession, custody, or control within thirty (30) days after entry of this Order. Disposal 
shall be by means that protect against unauthorized access to the customer information, 
such as by burning, pulverizing, or shredding any papers, and by erasing or destroying 
any electronic media, to ensure thatthe customer information cannot practicably be 
read or reconstructed. 
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Provided, however, that customer information need not be disposed of, and may 
be disclosed, to the extent requested by a government agency or required by a law, 
regulation, AVC, or court order. 
VII. COMPLIANCE MONITORING 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of monitoring and investigating 
compliance with any provision ofthis Order: 
A. Within ten (10) days of receipt of written notice from a representative of the 
Commission, Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, shall submit 
additional written reports, which are true and accurate and sworn to under penalty of 
perjury; produce documents for inspection and copying; appear for deposition; and 
provide entry during normal business hours to any business location In Defendant 
Home Assure's possession or direct or indirect control to inspect the business 
operation; 
B. In addition, the Commission is authorized to use all other lawful means, 
including but not limited to: 
1. obtaining discovery from any person, without further leave of court, 
using the procedures prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 
45 and 69; 
2. having its representatives pose as consumers and suppliers to 
Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, its 
employees, or any other entity managed or controlled in whole or in 
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part by Defendant Home Assure, without the necessity of 
identification or prior notice; and 
C. Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, shall permit 
representatives of the Commission to interview any employer, consultant, independent 
contractor, representative, agent, or employee who has agreed to such an interview, 
relating in any way to any conduct subject to this Order. The person interviewed may 
have counsel present. 
Provided howeve" that nothing in this Order shall limit the Commission's lawful use of 
compulsory process, pursuantto Sections 9 and 20 ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 
57b-1, to obtain any documentary material, tangible things, testimony, or information 
relevantto unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the 
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1». 
VIII. COMPLIANCE REPORTING 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in order that compliance with the provisions of 
this Order may be monitored: 
A. For a period of three (3) years from the date of entry of this Order, 
Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission 
of any changes in structure of Defendant Home Assure or any business entity that 
Defendant Home Assure directly or indirectly controls, or has an ownership interest in, 
that may affect compliance obligations arising under this Order, including but not limited 
to: incorporation or other organization; a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other 
action; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any 
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acts or practices subject to this Order; or a change in the business name or address, at 
least thirty (30) days prior to such change, provided that, with respect to any such 
change in the business entity about which Defendant Home Assure learn less than thirty 
(30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, Defendant Home Assure, and its 
successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after 
obtaining such knowledge. 
B. One hundred eighty (i80) days after the date of entry of this Order and 
annually thereafter for a period of three (3) years, Defendant Home Assure, and its 
successors and assigns, shall provide a written report to the FTC, which is true and 
accurate and sworn to under penalty of perjury, setting forth in detail the manner and 
form in which it has complied and is complying with this Order. This report shall include, 
but not be limited to: 
C. A copy of each acknowledgment of receipt of this Order, obtained pursuant 
to the Section titled "Distribution of Order;" and 
D. Any other changes required to be reported under Subsection A of this 
Section. 
E. Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, shall notify the 
Commission of the filing of a bankruptcy petition by Defendant Home Assure, and its 
successors and assigns, within fifteen (15) days of filing. 
F. For the purposes of this Order, Defendant Home Assure, and its 
successors and assigns, shall, unless otherwise directed by the Commission's 
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authorized representatives, send by overnight courier all reports and notifications 
required by this Order to the Commission, to the following address: 
Associate Director for Enforcement 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room NJ-2122 
Washington, D.C. 20580 
RE: FTC v. Home Assure, LLC, et a!. 8:09-cv-547-T23 TBM (MD. Fla.) 
Provided that, in lieu of overnight courier, Defendant Home Assure, and its 
successors and assigns, may send such reports or notifications by first-class mail, but 
only if Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, contemporaneously 
sends an electronic version of such report or notification to the Commission at: 
DEBrief@ftc.gov. 
G. For purposes of the compliance reporting and monitoring required by this 
Order, the Commission is authorized to communicate directly with the Defendant and its 
successors and assigns. 
IX. RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of six (6) years from the date of 
entry of this Order, in connection with the advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for 
sale, or sale of mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief services, Defendant 
Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, and their agents, employees, officers, 
corporations, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive 
actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, are hereby restrained and 
enjoined from failing to create and retain the following records: 
A. Accounting records that reflect the cost of goods or services sold, revenues 
generated, and the disbursement of such revenues; 
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B. Personnel records accurately reflecting: the name, address, and telephone 
number of each person employed in any capacity by such business, including as an 
independent contractor; that person's job title or position; the date upon which the 
person commenced work; and the date and reason for the person's termination, if 
applicable; 
C. Customer files containing the names, addresses, phone numbers, dollar 
amounts paid, quantity of items or services purchased, and description of items or 
services purchased, to the extent such information is obtained in the ordinary course of 
business; 
D. Complaints and refund requests (whether received directly or indirectly, 
such as through a third party) and any responses to those complaints or requests; 
E. Copies of all sales scripts, training materials, advertisements, or other 
marketing materials, including websites; and 
F. All records and documents necessary to demonstrate full compliance with 
each provision of this Order, including but not limited to, copies of acknowledgments of 
receipt of this Order required by the Sections titled "Distribution of Order" and 
"Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order" and all reports submitted to the FTC pursuant to 
the Section titled "Compliance Reporting." 
X. DISTRIBUTION OF ORDER 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of three (3) years from the date of 
entry ofthis Order, Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, shall 
deliver copies of the Order as directed be/ow: 
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A. Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, must deliver a 
copy of this Order to (1) all of its principals, officers, directors, and managers; (2) all of 
its employees, agents, and representatives who engage in conduct related to the 
subject matter of the Order; and (3) any business entity resulting from any change in 
structure set forth in Subsection A of the Section titled "Compliance Reporting." For 
current personnel, delivery shall be within five (5) days of service of this Order upon 
such Defendant. For new personnel, delivery shall occur prior to them assuming their 
responsibilities. For any business entity resulting from any change in structure set forth 
in Subsection A of the Section titled "Compliance Reporting," delivery shall be at least 
ten (10) days prior to the change in structure. 
B. Defendant Home Assure, and its successors and assigns, must secure a 
signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the Order, within thirty (30) days 
of delivery, from all persons receiving a copy of the Order pursuant to this Section. 
XI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF ORDER 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Home Assure, and its successors 
and assigns, within five (5) business days of receipt of this Order as entered by the 
Court, must submit to the Commission a truthful sworn statement acknowledging receipt 
of this Order. 
XII. COMPLETE SETTLEMENT 
The parties hereby consent to entry ofthis Order, which shall constitute a final 
judgment and order in this matter. The parties further stipulate and agree that the entry 
ofthis Order shall constitute a full, complete, and final settlement of this action. 
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XII. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter 
for purposes of construction, modification, and enforcement of this Order. 
ORDERED in Tampa. Florida, on July 29, 2010. 
STEVEN D. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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STIPULATED FlNAL JUDGMENT lNCLl.iDlNG AN INJUNCTION, 
CONSUMER REDRESS, AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Plaintiff, Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission), began this lawsuit by filing a 
Complaint seeking an injunction, consumer redress, and other equitable relief. The Complaint 
alleged that Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley violated Section 5(a) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, IS U.S.c. § Sea) by deceptively marketing their mortgage 
foreclosure rescue services. The parties have agreed to settle this matter upon the teml!'l and 
conditions contained in this STlPULA TED FINAL JUDG.MENT INCLUDING AN 
INJUNCTION, CONSUMER REDRESS, AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF (Stipulated 
Final Judgment), without adjudication of any issue of law or fact except as stated below and 
without Defendants admitting liability or wrongdoing for the conduct alleged in the Complaint. 








































1. This COUlt has jurisdiction over the subject matter ofth1s case and personal 
jurisdiction over Defendants. Venue in the Northern District of Ohio is proper. 
2. Defendants' activities, as aJIeged in the Complaint, are in or affecting commerce, 
as commerce is defined in Section 4 ofthc FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
3. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against 
Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley, pursuant to Sections 5(a) and 
13(b) ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 53(b). 
4. Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley, waive aU rights 
to seek judicial review or to otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment. 
5. Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley, waive any 
rights or claims they may have under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and any 
claims they may have against the Commission, or its employees, representatives, or agents. 
6. Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley. enter into this 
Stipulated Final Judgment freely and without coercion and acknowledge that they have read, 
understand, and are prepared to abide by the provisions of this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
7. This action and the relief awarded in this Stipulated Final Judgment are in addition 
to, and not in lieu of, other remedies that may be provided by law, whether civil or criminal. 
8. This action is the "commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce sllch governmental unit's police or regulatory power," as set forth 
in 11 U.S.c. § 362(b)(4). Any bankmptcy petition, voluntary or involuntary, does 110t 

































9. Any bankmptcy petition. voluntary or involuntary, does not divest this Court of 
jurisdiction to enter this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
10. Entry ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment is in the public interest 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions shall apply to this Stipulated Final Judgment: 
A. "Assisting Others" means knowingly providing any oftbe following goods or 
services to another business venture: (A) performing customer service functions, including, but 
not limited to, receiving or responding to consumer complaints; (B) formulating or providing, or 
arranging for the formulation or provision of, any marketing material; (C) providing names of, or 
. assisting in the generation of, potential customers; (0) hiring, recruiting, or training personnel; 
(E) advising or acting as a consultant to others on the commencement or management of a 
business venture; or (F) performing marketing services of any kind. 
B. uIndividual Defendant" means Timothy A. Buckley. 
C. "Corporate Defendant" means Foreclosure Solutions, LLC. dba Foreclosure Help 
One, and dba Program 10, and its successors and assigns. 
D. "Defendants" means the Individual Defendant and the Corporate Defendant, 
individually, collectively, or in any combination. 
E. "Document" means writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, images, and any other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which 
information can be obtained and translated, if necessary, into reasonably usable form and is 
synonymous in meaning and equal in scope to the usage of the term in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 34(a). A draft or non-identical copy of a document is a separate document within the 



































F. "Mortgage foreclosure rescue service" meanS any service, product, or program in 
which the offeror, expressly or by implication, claims that it can assist a homeowner in any 
manner to (A) stop. prevent, or postpone any home mortgage foreclosure sale; (B) obtain any 
forbearance from any beneficiary or mortgagee; (C) exercise any statutory right of reinstatement; 
(D) obtain any extension ofthe period within which the owner may reinstate his Of her 
obligation; (E) obtain any waiver of an acceleration clause contained in any promissory note or 
contract secured by a deed oftrust or mortgage on a residence in foreclosure or contained in that 
deed of trust or mortgage; (F) obtain a loan Or advance of funds; (G) avoid or repair any credit 
impairment resulting from mortgage default or foreclosure sale; (H) save the owner's residence 
from foreclosure; or (1) assist the owner in obtaining any remaining proceeds from the 
foreclosure sale ofthe owner's residence. The foregoing shall include any manner of claimed 
assistance, including, but not limited to, debt, budget, or financial counseling; receiving money 
for the purpose of distributing it to creditors; contacting creditors on behalf of the homeowner; 
arranging or attempting to arrange fbr an extension ofthe period within which the owner of 
property sold at foreclosure may cure his or her default; arranging or attempting to arrange for 
any delay or postponement of the time of a foreclosure sale; and giving advice of any kind with 
respectto filing for bankruptcy. 
G. The term "and" also means "or," and the term "or" also means "and." 
ORDER 
I. PROHIBITED BUSINESS ACTMTIES 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley, 
and their successors, assigns. agents, employees, officers, servants, and all other persons or 
entities in active concert or participation with them, who receive actllal notice of this Stipulated 
























Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise (inciuding, but not limited to, facsimile or 
electronic tnail), whether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or 
other device, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from the following: 
A. Falsely representing, or Assisting Others to falsely represent, expressly or by 
implication, any material fact in connection with the advertising, marketing, promoting, offering 
for sale, or sale of any mortgage foreclosure rescue service, including but not limited to 
misrepresenting: 
L that any home mortgage foreclosure can or will be stopped, postponed, or 
prevented; 
2. an ability to help all consumers, regardless of their individual 
circumstances or situations; 
3. the likelihood that home mortgage foreclosure can or will be stopped, 
postponed, or prevented; 
4. the degree of past success of any efforts to stop, postpone, or prevent home 
mortgage foreclosures; 
5. the number of satisfied customers or customer complaints; 
6 . the terms of any refund or guarantee; 
7. the likelihood that a consumer will receive a fuJI or partial refund if a home 
mortgage foreclosure is not stopped, postponed, or prevented; 
8. any other fact material to a consumer's decision to purchase any mortgage 
foreclosure rescue service. 
B. Falsely representing, or Assisting Others to falsely represent, expressly or by 
implication, any material fact in connection with the advertising, marketing, promoting, offering 















































n. PROHIDITIONS AGAINST DISTRIDUTION OF CUSTOl\ffiR lNFORIVIATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy 
A. Buckley. and their successors, assigns, agents, employees, officers, servants, and all other 
persons or entities in active concert or participation with them, who receive actual notice ofthis 
Stipulated Final Judgment by personal service or othenvise, whether acting directly or through 
any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, are pennanently restrained and enjoined 
from selling, renting, leasing, transferring, or otherwise disclosing, and from benefitting from or 
using, the name, address, telephone number, email address, credit card number, Social Security 
Number, bank account number, or other identifying infonnation of any person who provided any 
such information to Defendants at any time in connection with the advertising, marketing, 
promoting, offering for sale, or sale of mortgage foreclosure rescue services; provided, however, 
that Defendants may disclose such identifying information to any law enforcement or regulatory 
agency, or as required by any law. regulation, or court order. 
III. DISPOSAL OF SENSITIVE CUSTOl\ffiR INFORMATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy 
A. Buckley, and their successors, assigns, agents, employees, officers, servants, and all other 
persons or entities in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this 
Stipulated Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise, whether acting directly or through 
any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, are pennanently restrained and enjoined 
from failing to take reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to or use of 


























advertising. marketing, promotion, offering for sale, or sale of mortgage foreclosure rescue 
services. Reasonable measures include. but are not limited to, the following: 
1. Burning, pulverizing, or shredding papers containing sensitive consumer 
information so that the infonnation cannot practicably be read or reconstructed; and 
2. Destroying or erasing electronic media oontaining sensitive consumer 
information so that the infonnation cannot practicably be read or reconstructed. 
For purposes ofthis Section, "sensitive consumer infonnation" means (a) an 
individuaJ's Social Security Number, financial account number, or any other information 
that enables Defendants or others to access that individual's acoount (such as a credit card, 
debit card, checking, saving, money market, stock commodities, share or similar account, 
utility bill, or mortgage Joan account), or (b) an individual's name, address, or telephone 
number in combination with the individual's date of birth, driver's license number, other 
state identification number, foreign country equivalent to a driver's license or state 
identification number, or passport number. 
IV. MONETARY .JUDGMENT At'ID CONSUMER REDRESS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
A. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the FTC and against Defendants, 
Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, and Timothy A. Buckley, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($8,500,000) (the "Total Judgxnent") for the 
payment of equitable monetary relief-including, but not limited to, consumer redress or 
disgorgement, and for paying any attendant expenses of administration of any redress fund. 
B. Except as provided in Section V, below, the Total Judgment shall be suspended 





































1. The proceeds from the sale of the properties listed below that would 
otherwise be paid to any Defendant. including proceeds from a sale caused by or related to 
a foreclosure. are paid to the FTC within ten (lO) days of the sale. Any sheriff: title 
company, or other person involved in such a sale may rely on this Stipulated Final 
Judgment as authority to deliver a Defendant's share ofthe proceeds directly to the FTC. 
a. 6638 Orleans Court, Hamilton County, Ohio, Auditor Parcel 
Number 24 7 ~0007 -0291-00 
b. 8406 Jackies Drive. Hamilton County, Ohio, Auditor Parcel 
Number 510-0061-0046-00 
c. 818 Danny Drive, Clermont County, Ohio, Auditor Parcel Number 
414135A114 
Provided, Iwwel1er, that this provision shall not apply to any property sold or otherwise 
disposed ofpl.lrsuantto order of this Court befo!e entry of this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
2. Defendant Buckley. within ten (JO) days of entry of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment, transfers to the law firm Ulmer and Berne, PC, all of his right, title, and interest 
ill the property at 838 Crowden Drive. Hamilton County. Ohio, Auditor Parcel Number 
590-0213-0186-00, and forever waives, releases, discharges, and disclaims aU right, title 
and interest in the Crowden Drive property and the proceeds from any sale of it. 
3. Defendants within ten (10) days of entry ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, 
a. deliver to US Bank a signed copy of this Stipulated Final Judgment; 
US Bank shall, within five (5) business days of receipt of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment, transfer to the FTC all funds in the account in the name of Foreclosure 














































b. deliver to Fifth Third Bank a signed copy oflbis Stipulated Final 
Judgment; Fifth Third Bank shall, within five (5) business days of receipt of this 
Stipulated Final Judgment, transfer to the FTC all funds in the account in the name 
of Timothy A. Buckley ending in 6128. 
4. Defendant Buckley, within ten (10) days of entry ofthis Stipulated Final 
Judgment, assigns to the FTC all of his right, title, and interest in any and all payments, 
restitution or othenvise, due him from Robert Buchanan pursuant to file number AP-99118 
at the Hamilton County, Ohio, Adult Probation Department; Buckley shall cooperate fully 
in this assignment and shall promptly execute all documents and take all actions necessary 
or appropriate to effect this assignment; any restitution payments received by Defendant 
Buckley after entry ofthis StipUlated Final Judgment shall be delivered to the FTC within 
ten (10) days orthe date Defendant Buckley receives them. 
5. Within one hundred eighty (180) days of entry of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment, Defendant Buckley sells the property at 8141 Bridlemaker Lane. Hamilton 
County, Ohio, Auditor Parcel Number 600-0012-0043-00, upon terms and conditions 
acceptable to the FTC. Defendant Buckley shall promptly comply with al1 reasonable 
requests from the FTC related to that sale, including, but not limited to, signing listing 
contracts with real estate agents, keeping the property in good repair, keeping the property 
in a condition suitable 1br showing to prospective purchasers, signing contracts for the sale 
of the property, and signing all documents necessary or appropriate for the transfer of the 
p~operty to a new buyer. Upon the sale of the property, all proceeds that would otherwise 
go to Defendant Buckley shall be paid to the FTC. Any sheriff: title company, or other 
person involved in such a sale may rely on this Stipulated Final Judgment as authority to 
































not sold within one hundred eighty (180) days of the entry ofthis Stipulated Final 
Judgment, Defendant Buckley shall comply promptly with the instructions from the FTC's 
Associate Director for Enforce~ent concerning disposition ofthe property, which may 
include transferring the property to one or marc mortgagors or lienholders or allowing the 
FTC to place a judgment lien on the property. Provided, however, that this provision shall 
not apply if the Bridlemaker Lane properly is sold or othenvise disposed of pursuant to 
order of this Court before entry of this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
6. Defendant Bucldey or the transferee shall be responsible for any federal~ 
state or local taxeS or fees on the sale or transfer of property required by this Section IV. 
C. Properties or other assets transferred to the Commission pursuant to Sections rv 
and V of this StipUlated Final Judgment shall be deposited into a fund administered by the 
Commission or its designated representative to be used for equitable relief, including, but not 
limited to, consumer redress and any attendant expenses for the administration of any redress 
fund. Defendants "vill cooperate fully to assist the Commission in identifying consumers who 
may be entitled to redress pursuant to this Stipulated Final Judgment. In the event that direct 
o 
if) 
t.6 redress to consumers is wholly or partially impracticable or funds remain after redress is 
t-
o 
;; completed, the Commission may apply funds for any other equitable relief (including consumer 
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alleged in the complaint. Any funds not used for this equitable relief shall be deposited into the 
U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Defendants shall have no right to challenge the Commission's 
choice of remedies under this Section. 
D. Defendants relinquish all dominion, control, and title to the properties and other 
assets transferred to the fullest extent permitted by law. Defendants shall malce no claim to, or 





























E. Defendants stipulate and agree that the facts as alleged in the Complaint filed in 
this action shall be taken as true without further proof in any bankruptcy case or subsequent civil 
litigation pursued by the Commission to enforce its rights to any payment or money judgment 
pursuant to this Stipulated Final Judgment, including, but not limited to, a nondischargeability 
complaint in any bankruptcy case. Defendants further stipulate and agree that the facts alleged 
in the Complaint establish all elements necessary to sustain an action pursuant to, and that this 
Stipulated Final Judgment shall have collateral estoppel effect for purposes of, Section 
523(a)(2)(A) oftlle Bankmptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
F. Defendants stipulate and agree that the judgment entered pursuant to this Section is 
equitable monetary relief, solely remedial in nature, and is not a fine, penalty. punitive 
assessment, or forfeiture. 
G. Defendants are hereby required, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 7701, to furnish 
their taxpayer identifYing numbers (Social Security Number or Employer Identification Number) 
to the Commission, which numbers shall be used for purposes of collecting and reporting on any 
delinquent amount arising out of Defendants' relationship with the government. 
v. RIGHT TO REOPEN MONETARY JUDGMENT 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
A. By agreeing to this Stipulated Final Judgment, Defendants reaffirm and attest to 
the truthfulness, accuracy, and completeness of Defendants' written Financial Statements 
submitted by Defendants to the Commission on December 8, 2008, as supplemented on __ _ 
o ':l./zal''[ . This Court's Stipulated Final Judgment, and the Plaintiff's agreement to enter 
into this Stipulated Final Judgment, is expressly premised upon the truthfulness, accuracy, and 
completeness of Defendants' financial conditions, as represented in the Financial Statements 
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referenced above,which contain material infonnation upon which the Commission relied in 
negotiating and agreeing to the terms of this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
B. If, upon motion by Plaintiff, this Court should fmd that one or more Defendants 
failed to disclose any material asset, or materially misrepresented the value of any asset, or made 



















shaH reinstate the Total Judgment against such Defendant and in favor of the Commission, less 
any payments made to, and the value of properties or other assets transferred to, the 
Commission, plus interest from the entry date ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1961. Defendants and the Commission stipulate that the Total Judgment is the 
estimated minimum consumer injury caused, jointly and severally, by Defendants. If the Total 
Judgment is reinstated, all other provisions of ills Stipulated Final Judgment shall remain in full 
force and effect unless othenvise ordered by the Court. 
VI. COMPLIANCE MONITORING 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of (i) monitoring and investigating 
compliance with any provision of this Stipulated Final Judgment and (li) investigating the 
accuracy of Defendants' financial statements, upon·which the Commission's agreement to this 
StipUlated Final Judgment is expressly premised: 
A. Within ten (10) days of receipt ohvTitten notice from a representative of the 
Commission, Defendants each shall submit additional written reports, which are true and 
accurate and sworn to under penalty of pcrjury; produce documents for inspection and copying; 
appear for deposition; and provide entry during nonnal business hours to any business location 







































B. In addition, the Commission is authorized to use all other lawful means, including, 
but not limited to: 
1. obtaining discovery from any person, without further leave of Court, using 
the procedures prescribed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30,31,33,34,36,45, and 
69; 
2. posing as consumers and suppliers to Defendants, their employees, or any 
other entity managed or controHed in whole or in part by any Defendant, without the 
necessity of identification or prior notice; and 
C. Defendants each shall permit representatives of the Commission to interview any 
employer, consultant, independent contractor, representative, agent, or employee who has agreed 
to such an interview, reiating in any way to any conduct subject to this Stipulilted Final 
Judgment. The person interviewed may have counsel present. 
Provided 110 wever, that nothing in this Stipulated Final Judgment shall limit the Commission's 
lawful usc of compulsory process, pursuant to Sections 9 and 20 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. 
§§ 49 and 57b-l, to obtain any documentary material, tangible things, testimony. or information 
relevant to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1» . 
VII. COMPLIANCE REPORTING 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in order that compliance with the provisions ofthis 
Stipulated Final Judgment may be monitored: 

















1. Timothy A. Buckley, the Individual Defendant, shall notify the 
Commission of the following: 
a. Any changes in such Defendant's residence. mailing addresses, and 
telephone numbers, within ten (10) days of the date of such change; 
b. Any changes in such Defendant's employment status (including 
self-employment), and any change in such Defendant's ownership in any business 
entity. within ten (10) days of the date of stich change. Such notice shall include 
the name and address of each business that such Defendant is affiliated with, 
employed by. creates or forms, or performs services for; a detailed description of 
the nature of the business; and a detailed description of such Defendant's duties 
and responsibilities in connection with the business or employment; and 
c. Any changes in such Defendant's name or use of any aliases or 
fictitious names; 
2. Defendants shaH notify the Commission of any changes in structure of any 
Corporate Defendant or any business entity that any Defendant directly or indirectly 
controls, or has an ownership interest in, that may affect compliance obligations arising 
under this Stipulated Final Judgment, including but not limited to: incorporation or other 
organization; a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action; the creation or 
dissolution of a subsidiary. parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject 
to this Stipulated Final Judgment; or a change in the business name or address, at least 
thirty (30) days prior to such change, provided that, with respect to any proposed change 
in the business entity about which a Defendant learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the 
date such action is to take place, such Defendant shall notify the Commission as SOon as is 


































B. One hundred eighty (180) days after the date of entry of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment and annually thereafter for a period of seven (7) years; Defendants each shall provide 
a written report to the FTC, which is true and accurate and sworn to under penalty ofperjury, 
setting forth in detail the manner and fonn in which they have complied and are complying with 
this Stipulated Final Judgment. This report shaH include, but not be limited to: 
1. For Timothy A. Buckley, the Individual Defendant: 
a. such Defendant's then-current residence address, mailing addresses, 
and telephone numbers; 
b. such Defendant's then-current employment status (including self-
employment), including the name, addresses, and telephone numbers of each 
business that such Defendant is affiliated with, employed by, or performs services 
for; a detailed description of the nature of the business; and a detailed description 
of sllch Defendant's duties and responsibilities in connection with the business or 
employment; and 
c. Any other changes required to be reported under Subsection A of 
this Section. 
2. For all Defendants: 
a. A copy of each acknowledgment of receipt of this Stipulated Final 
Judgment, obtained pursuant to Section X; and 
h. Any other changes required to be reported under Subsection A of 
this Section. 
C. Each Defendant shall notifY the Commission of the filing ofa bankruptcy petition 







































D. For the purposes ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, Defendants shall, unless 
otherwise directed by the Commission's authorized representatives, send by overnight courier all 
reports and notifications required by this Stipulated Final Judgment to the Commission, to the 
following address: 
Associate Director for Enforcement 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room NJ-2122 
Washington, D.C. 20580 
RE: FTC v. Foreclosure Solutions, LLC 
Provided (Jud, in lieu of overnight courier, Defendants may send such reports or notifications by 
first-class mail, but only if Defendants contemporaneously send an electronic version of such 
report or notification to the Commission at DEBrief@ftc.gov. 
E. For purposes ofthe compliance reporting and monitoring required by this 
Stipulated Final Judgment, the Commission is authorized to communicate directly with each 
Defendant 
VIII. RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period often (10) years from the date of entry of 
this Stipulated Final Judgment, Defendants, and tllOse businesses where any Defendant is the 
majority owner or otherwise controls the business, and their agents, employees, officers, 
corporations, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual 
notice of this Stipulated Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise, in connection with the 
advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or sale of mortgage foreclosure rescue 






































A. Accounting records that reflect the cost of goods or services sold, revenues 
generated, and the disbursement of such revenues; 
B. Personnel records accurately reflecting; the name, address, and telephone number 
of each person employed in any capacity by such business, including as an independent 
contractor; that person's job title or position; the date upon which the person commenced work; 
and the date and reason for the person's termination, if applicable; 
C. Customer files containing the names, addresses, phone numbers, dollar amounts 
paid, quantity of items or services purchased, and description of items or services purchased, to 
the extent such information is obtained in the ordinary course of business; 
D. Complaints and refund requests (whether received directly, indirectly, or through 
any third party) and any responses to those complaints or requests; 
E. Copies of aJl sales scripts, training materials, advertisements, or other marketing 
materials, including websites and web logs; and 
F. Ali records and documents necessary to demonstrate full compliance with each 
provision ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, induding, but not limited to, copies of 
acknowledgments of receipt of this Stipulated Final Judgment required by Sections IX and X and 
all reports submitted to the FTC pursuant to Section VII. 
IX. DISTRIBUTION OF ORDER BY DEFENDANTS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of seven (7) years from the date of entry 
ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, Defendants shall deliver copies of the StipUlated Final 
Judgment as directed below: 
A. Corporate Defendant: Each Corporate Defendant must deliver a copy of this 



























its employees, agents, and representatives who engage in conduct related to the subject matter of 
the Stipulated Final Judgment; and (3) any business entity resulting from any change in structure 
set forth in Section Vll. For current personnel, delivery shaH be within five (5) days of service 
oftl1i5 Stipulated Final Judgment upon such Defendant. For new personnel, delivery shaH occur 
prior to them assuming their responsibilities. For any business entity resulting from any change 
in structure set forth in Section VII, delivery shall be at least ten (10) days prior to the change in 
structure. 
B. Individual Defendant as Control Person: For any business that Individual 
Defendant controls, directly or indirectly, or in which such Defendant has a majority ownership 
interest, such Defendant must deliver a copy of this Stipulated Final Judgment to (1) all 
principals, officers, directors, and managers of that business; (2) all employees, agents, and 
representatives of that business who engage in conduct related to the subject matter of the 
Stipulated Final Judgment; and (3) any business entity resulting from any change in structure set 
forth above in Section VlI.A.2 (titled Compliance Reporting). For current personnel, delivery 
shaH be within five (5) days of service of this Stipulated Final Judgment upon such Defendant. 
For new personnel, delivery shall occur prior to them assuming their responsibilities. For any 
business entity resulting from any change in structure set forth above in Section VII.A.2 (titled 
Compliance Reporting) dclivery shall be at least ten (10) days prior to the change in structure. 
C. lndividual Defendant as employee or non-control person: For any business where 
Individual Defendant is not a controlling person of a business but otherwise engages in conduct 
related to the subject matter ofthis Stipulated Final Judgment, such Defendant must deliver a 
copy oftMs Stipulated Final Judgment to all principals and managers of such business before 
















D. Defendants must secure a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the 
Stipulated Final Judgment, within thirty (30) days of delivery, from all persons receiving a copy 
of the Stipulated Final Judgment pursuant to this Section. 
X. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF ORDER BY DEFENDANT 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each Defendant, within five (5) business days of 
receipt of this Stipulated Final Judgment as entered by the Court, including receipt by facsimile 
or email, must submit to the Commission a truthful sworn statement acknowledging receipt of 
this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
XI. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for 
purposes of construction, modification, and enforcement of this Stipulated Final Judgment. 
SO ORDERED and approved this 9th day of July 
lsI SOLOMON OLIVER, JR. 
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR 



























STlPULATED AND AGREED TO: 
DEFENDANTS 
Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, 
dba Foreclosure Help One, and 
dba Program 10 
By' ~~ ~0~~~~~=-
Print Name: .z;iWdy,tJ '" r;gtJdc4:y 
Title: WJ/~T 
Date: 07111 tlSj ;;J..co9 
Imothy . uckley, individual and as an 
principal of Forec!osure Solutions, LLC 
Date: ~k.z 
PLAINTIFF 
Willard K. Tom 
Federal Trade Commission 
General Counsel 
" -ATHAN L. KESSLER 
CO Bar # 15094 
JK,~ssler@ftc.QoV 
216-263-3436 
LARISSA L. BUNGO 
OH Bar # 66148 
LBun!w({l)fic.go¥ 
216-263-3403 
Federal Trade Commission 
11 J 1 Superior Ave., Suite 200 
Cleveland, OH 44114 
216-263-3455 
FAX 216-263-2426 
Date: ----.':r-b--"~'--o_Cj'---__ _ 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTR4.L DISTRICT OF CAUFORNIA 








17 Loss 1\Jlitigation Services, Inc., et a1. 
18 
19 Defendants. 
) Case No. SACV09-800 DOC (.1\Nx) 
J FlNAL ORDER FOR ) P~IANENT INWNCTION 
) AND SETTL~IENT OF CLAIl\'IS 
) AS TO DEFENDANT 
l BERNADETTE PERRY (A.K.A. (BERNADETTE CARR AND BERNADETTE CARR-PERRY) l Judge: Hon. David o. Carter 
20 ) 
-------------------------------
21 Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission ('FTC") commenced this civil action on 
22 July 13,2009, pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), to obtain 
23 preliminary and permanent injunctive and other equitable relief for Defendants' 
24 violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. § 45, in connection with the 
25 marketing and sale of mortgage loan modification and foreclosure relief services. 
26 The Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order as to all parties on July 20,2009 
27 ("TRO") [Docket Itm. #14], a Preliminary InjlU1ction Order as to Defendants Loss 
28 Mitigation Services, Inc. ("LlvfS") and Synergy Financiallvfanagement Corporation, 
C e8:09-cv-00800-DOC-AN Document110 Filed07/14/10 Page2of20 PageID#:193q 
1 also ,Llb/a Direct Lender and DirectLender.com ("Synergy" or "Direct Lender") on 
') August 18, 2009 [Docket Itm. #41], a Preliminary InjlUlction Order as to Benladette 
3 Perry and Tony Perry on August 19, 2009 [DocketItm. #43] ("Perry PI Order"), and 
4 a Preliminary InjlUlction Order as to Dean Shafer on August 19, 2009 [Docket Itm. 
5 #44]. 
6 The TRO in this case enjoined Defendant Bernadette Perry from, among other 
7 things, collecting advance fees from conSlUll ers, and making certain representations 
8 about Defendants' services. The TRO also contained an asset freeze. The Perry PI 
9 Order enjoined Defendant Benladette Perry from, among other things, collecting 
10 advance fees fro111 conSluners, and collecting payments from conSlUllers for services 
11 prior to the date of the Perry PI Order. The Perry PI Order continued the asset freeze 
12 from the TRO, and provided certain allowances, ::'1..lCh as reasonable and necessary 
13 living expenses. 
14 PlaintitI FTC and Defendant Pro Se Bernadette Perry have now stipulated to 
15 entry of a Final Order for Pennanent InjlUlction and Settlement of Claims as to 
16 Defendant Bernadette Perry (A.K.A. Bemadette Carr and Benladette Carr-Perry). 
17 This Court, having considered the Complaint, exhibits, memoranda, declaratioll.,), and 
18 other submissions of the parties, and now being advised in the premises, hereby 
19 enters this Order: 
20 FINDINGS 
21 1. This is an action by the FTC brought pursuant to Sections 5 and I3(b) 
22 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 45 and 53(b). The Complaint seeks both penn anent 
23 injlUlctive relief and conSlUner redress for the Defendants' alleged deceptive act') or 
24 practices in c01mection \vith the marketing and sale of mortgage loan modification 
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2. The FTC has authority lU1der Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to seek the 
2 relief it has requested, and the Com plaint states a claim upon which relief can be 
3 granted against the Defendants. 
4 3. This Court has subject matter jmisdiction pmsuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
5 1331, 1337(a) and 1345, and 15 U.S.c. §§ 45(a) and 53(b) and has jurisdiction over 
6 the Defendants. Venue in the Central District of Califomia is proper. 
7 4. The activities of the Defendants, as alleged in the Complaint, are in or 
8 affecting commerce, as defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
9 5. The parties stipulate and agree to entry of this Order, without trial or 
10 final adjudication of any issue of fact or la\v, to settle and resolve all matters in 
11 dispute arising from the conduct alleged in the Complaint to the date of entry of this 
12 Order. 
13 6. Defendant Bernadette Perry waives all rights to seek judicial revie\v or 
14 otherwise challenge or contest the validity of tlus Order. Defendant Bemadette Perry 
15 also \vaives any claim that she may have held lU1der the Equal Access to Justice Act, 
16 28 U. S. C. § 2412, conceming tile prosecution of tIus action to the date of fuis Order. 
17 Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees. 
18 7. This action and the relief mvarded herein, are in addition to, and not in 
19 lieu ot: other remedies as may be provided by Imv, including both civil and criminal 
20 remedies. 
21 8. Entry of this Order is in the public interest. 
22 DEFINITIONS 
23 F or the purposes of this Order, the follo\ving definitiol1.,) shall apply: 
24 1. "Assisting others" includes, but is not limited to, providing any of the 
25 follmving goods or services to anofuer person: (A) perfom1ing customer service 
26 functions, including, but not limited to, receiving or responding to consumer 
27 complaint'); (B) formulating or providing, or arranging for the formulation or 
28 
3 
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I 
1 provision o( any telephone sales script or any other marketing material, including 
2 but not limited to direct mail, the text of any Intenlet website, email, or other 
3 electronic comllllmication; (C) providing names o( or assisting in the generation of, 
4 potential customers; (D) performing marketing services of any kind; or (E) acting or 
5 serving as an owner, officer, director, manager, or principal of such entity. 
6 2. "Credit" means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer 
7 payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment. 
8 3. "Debt relief service" means any service, including debt management 
9 plans, debt settlement, debt negotiation, and for-profit credit cOlll1seling, 
10 represented, expressly or by implication, to renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the 
11 terms of payment or other tenllS of the debt between a conSLUller and one or more 
12 unsecured creditors, servicers, or debt collectors, including but not limited to, a 
13 reduction in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed by a conSLU11er to an lll1secured 
14 creditor, servicer, or debt collector. 
15 4. "Defendants" means, individually, collectively, or in any combination: 
16 (a) Loss 1\1itigation Services, Inc. ("LlviS"); (b) Synergy Financial lvianagement 
17 Corporation, also d/b/a Direct Lender and Direct Lender.com ("Direct Lender"); (c) 
18 Dean Shafer; (D) Ben13dette Perry (a.ka Bernadette Carr and Bemadette Carr-Perry) 
19 and (E) Ivfarion Anthony (a.ka. "Tony") Perry. uCOIporate Defendants" means, 
20 individually or collectively: (a) LlviS; and (b) Direct Lender. 
21 5. "Financial related good or sen'ice" means any good, service, plan, or 
22 program that is represented, expressly or by implication, to (A) provide any 
23 consumer, arrange for any consumer to receive, or assist any conSLUner in receiving, 
24 credit, debit, or stored value cards; (B) improve, or arrange to improve, any 
25 consLUller's credit record, credit history, or credit rating; (C) provide advice or 
26 assistance to any conSLUller with regard to any activity or service the purpose of 
27 which is to improve a consLUller's credit record, credit history, or credit rating; (D) 
28 
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1 provide any consumer, arrange for any conSlUller to receive, or assist any conSlU11er 
? in receiving, a loan or other extension of credit~ (E) provide any consumer, arrange 
3 for any conSlUller to receive, or assist any conSlUller in receiving, debt relief services; 
4 (F) provide any consumer, arrange for any consumer to receive, or assist any 
5 conSlUller in receiving any service represented, expressly or by implication, to 
6 renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the temlS of payment or other tenllS of the debt 
7 between a consumer and one or more secured creditors, servicers, or debt collectors. 
8 6. «FederallwmeOlvner relief or financial stabilityprogl'am" means any 
9 program (including its sponsoring agencies, telephone mUll bers, and Intemet 
10 vvebsites) operated or endorsed by the United States govemment to provide relief to 
11 homeowners or stabilize the economy, including but not limited to (A) the 1:vfaking 
12 Home Affordable Program; (B) the Financial Stability Plan; (C) the Troubled Asset 
13 Relief Program and any other program sponsored or operated by the United States 
14 Department of the Treasury; (D) the HOPE for Homeowners program, any program 
15 operated or created pursuant to the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, and any 
16 other program sponsored or operated by the Federal HOll.'3ing Achninistration; or (E) 
17 any program sponsored or operated by the United States Department of Housing and 
18 Urban Development ("HUD"), the HOPE NO\V Alliance, the Homeownership 
19 Preservation FOlUlclation, or any other BUD-approved housing cOlUlseling agency. 
20 7. "J.1Iaterialfact" means any fact that is likely to affect a person's choice 
21 of or conduct regarding, goods or services. 
22 8. "1110rtgage loan modification or foreclosure relief sen'ice" means any 
23 good, service, plan, or program that is represented, expressly or by implication, to 
24 assist a conSlU11er in any manner to (A) stop, prevent, or postpone any home 
25 mortgage or deed oftnlst foreclosure sale; (B) obtain or arrange a modification of 
26 any tenn of a home loan, deed oftnlst, or mortgage; (C) obtain any forbearance irom 
27 any mortgage loan holder or servicer; CD) exercise any right of reinstatement of any 
28 
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1 residential mortgage loan; (E) obtain, arrmlge, or attempt to obtain or arrange any 
2 extension of the period \'lithin which the owner of property sold at foreclosure may 
3 cure his or her default or reinstate his or her obligation~ (F) obtain any '\vaiver of an 
4 acceleration clause contained in any promissory note or contract secured by a deed of 
5 tmst or mortgage on a residence in foreclosure or contained in that deed of trust; (G) 
6 obtain a loan or advance of flmds that is cOlmected to the conSlUner's home 
7 ownership; (H) avoid or ameliorate the impainnent of the conSlUner's credit record, 
8 credit history, or credit rating that is cOlmected to the consumer's home O\'lnership; 
9 (1) save the conSlUner's residence from foreclosure; (J) assist the conSlUner in 
10 obtaining proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the consumer's residence; (K) obtain 
11 or arrange a pre-foreclosure sale, short sale, or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; (L) obtain 
12 or arrange a refinancing, recapitalization, or reinstatement of a home loan, deed of 
13 tnlst, or mortgage; (!vI) audit or examine a conSlUner's mortgage or home loan 
14 application; or (N) obtain, arrange, or attempt to obtain or arrange any exten.<;ion of 
15 the period within which the renter of property sold at foreclosure may continue to 
16 occupy the property. The foregoing shall include mly mmmer of claimed assistance, 
17 including, but not limited to, debt, credit, budget, or financial counseling; receiving 
18 money for the purpose of distributing it to creditors; contacting creditors or servicers 
19 on behalf of the conSlUner; and giving advice of any kind \'lith respect to filing for 
20 bankruptcy. 
21 9. "Person" means a natural person, organization, or other legal entity, 
22 including a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, association, cooperative, or any 
23 other group or combination acting as ml entity. 
24 10. "Servicer" means any beneficiary, mortgagee, tnlstee, loan servicer, 
25 loan holder, or any entity performing loan or credit account administration or 








4 BAN ON lVIORTGAGE LOAN lVIODIFICATION AND FORECLOSURE 
5 RELIEF SERVICES 
6 I. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Bemadette Perry, whether 
7 acting directly or through any other person, is permanently restrained and enjoined 
8 from 
9 A. Advertising, marketing, promoting, offering for sale, or selling any 
10 mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service; and 
11 B. }\ssisting others engaged in advertising, marketing, promoting, offering 
12 for sale, or selling any mortgage loan modification or foreclosure relief service. 
13 Provided, that if Defendant Bemadette Perry holds a real estate sales license in 
14 good standing from the appropriate state real estate licensing agency, and is 
15 employed by a broker that holds a license in good standing from the appropriate state 
16 real estate agency, Parts LA. and B. shall not prohibit Defendant Benladette Perry 
17 from doing or negotiating to do one or m ore of the following acts for another or 
18 others: selling or offering to sell, buying or ofTering to buy, soliciting prospective 
19 sellers or purchasers of, soliciting or obtaining listings of~ or negotiating the 
20 purchase, sale or exchange of real property in a purchase money real estate 
21 transaction. 
22 
23 PROHIBITED REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO FIN. .. 4NCIAL 
24 RELATED GOODS ~4ND SERVICES 
25 II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bernadette Perry and her 
26 successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, and attonleys, and those 
27 persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them who receive 
28 
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1 actual notice of this Order by personal service, facsimile transmission, email, or 
") otherwise, whether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, 
3 or other device, in cOImection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering 
4 for sale or sale of any financial related good or service, are hereby pennanently 
5 restrained and enjoined from: 
6 A. lv1isrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, expressly or by 
7 implication, any material fact, including but not limited to: 
8 1. The terms or rates that are available for any loan or other 
9 extension of credit, including but not limited to: 
10 (a) closing costs or other fees; 
11 (b) the payment schedule, the monthly payment amount(s), or 
12 other payment tenns, or whether there is a balloon payment; interest rate(s), mmual 
13 percentage rate(s), or finance charge; the loan ammmt, the ammU1t of credit, the draw 
14 amount, or outstanding balance; the loan term, the dra\v period, or maturity; or any 
15 other tenn of credit; 
16 (c) the savings associated ''lith the credit; 
17 (d) the ammU1t of cash to be disbursed to the borrower out of 
18 the proceeds, or the amolU1t of cash to be disbursed on behalf of the borrower to any 
19 third parties; 
20 (e) whether the payment of the minimlUll amount specified 
21 each month covers both interest and principal. and whether the credit has or can 
22 result in negative amortization; 
23 (0 that the credit does not have a prepayment penalty or that 
24 no prepaym ent penalty ancll or other fees or costs will be incurred if the COllSlUn er 
25 subsequently refinances; and 
26 (g) that the interest rate(s) or annual percentage rate(s) are 
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1 That any person can improve any consumer's credit record, credit 
2 history, or credit rating by pennanently removing negative information from the 
3 consmner's credit record, credit history, or credit rating, even where such 
4 infonnation is accurate and not obsolete~ 
5 3. i\ny person's ability to improve or otherwise affect a consmner's 
6 credit record, credit history, or credit rating or ability to obtain credit~ 
7 4. Any aspect of any debt relief service, including but not limited to, 
8 the amOlU1t of savings a consmner will receive from purchasing, using, or em'oIling 
9 in such debt relief service: the amount of time before which a consmner will receive 
10 settlem ent of the consumer's debts; or the reduction or cessation of collection calls: 
11 and 
12 5. That a COnSl1l11er "vill receive legal representation; 
13 B. Advertising or assisting others in advertising credit temlS other than 
14 those terms that actually are or will be arranged or offered by a creditor or lender. 
15 PROmBITED REPRESENTATIONS RELATING TO ANY GOODS OR 
16 SERVI(~ES 
17 ITI. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bernadette Perry and her 
18 successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, and attonleys, and those 
19 persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them \vho receive 
20 actual notice of tlns Order by personal senrice, facsimile transmission, email, or 
21 othenvise, whether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, 
22 or otller device, in cOlmection ,\"rith the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering 
23 for sale or sale of any good, senTice, plan, or program are hereby pennanently 
24 restrained and enjoined from misrepresenting or assisting others in misrepresenting, 
25 expressly or by implication, any material fact, including but not limited to: 
26 A. Any material aspect of the nature or terms of any refl..U1d, cancellation, 
exchange, or repurchase policy, including, but not limited to, the likelihood of a 
28 
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1 COnSlUller obtaining a full or partial ref1md, or the circlUllstances in \vhich a f1l11 or 
2 partial retlmd will be granted to the COnSlUller; 
3 B. That any person is affiliated \vith, endorsed or approved by, or 
4 otherwise connected to any other person, govennnent entity, any federal homeowner 
5 relief or financial stability program, or any other program; 
6 C. The total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, the good 
7 or serVice; 
8 D. .A.ny material restriction, limitation, or condition to purchase, receive, or 
9 use the good or service; and 
10 E. Any material aspect of the perfonnance, efficacy, natme, or 
11 characteristics of the good or service. 
12 PROIDBITIONS ON USE OF CUSTOlVIER INFORlVIATION 
13 IV. IT IS F1JRTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bernadette Perry and her 
14 successors, assigns, officers, agents, servants, employees, and attonleys, and those 
15 persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them who receive 
16 actual notice of this Order by personal service, facsimile transmission, email, or 
17 otherwise, \vhether acting directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, 
18 or other device, are permanently restrained and enjoined from: 
19 A. disclosing, using, or benefitting from customer infonnation, including 
20 the name, address, telephone nmnber, email address, social security mUl1ber, other 
21 identifying infon11ation, or any data that enables access to a customer's accOlmt 
22 (including a credit card, bank account, or other financial account), of any person 
23 which any Defendant obtained prior to entry of this Order in connection with the 
24 advertising, marketing, promotion, otTering for sale or sale of any mortgage loan 
25 modification or foreclosure relief service, and 
26 B. failing to dispose of such customer information in all forms in their 
27 possession, custody, or control within thirty (30) days after entry of this Order. 
28 
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1 Disposal shall be by means that protect against lmauthorized access to the customer 
2 information, such as by blIDling, pulverizing, or shredding any papers, and by 
3 erasing or destroying any electronic media, to ensure that the customer infonnation 
4 CaImot practicably be read or reconstructed. 
5 c. Provided, howevel', that customer infonnation need not be disposed ot 
6 and may be disclosed, to the extent requested by a govermnent agency or required by 





IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
A. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant Benladette Perry, in the 
11 amount of six million tvvo hlmdred sixty tVi70 thousand five hlmdred nine dollars and 
~ 
12 sixty two cents ($6,262,509.62); provided, hOlrel'el~ that this judgment shall be 
13 suspended only as long as the Court makes no finding, as provided in Section VI of 
14 this Order, that DefendaIlt Bernadette Perry materially mIsrepresented or omitted the 
15 nature, existence, or value of aIly asset; 
16 B. Defendant Bernadette Perry agrees that the facts as alleged in the 
17 Complaint filed in tins action shall be taken as tme \VitIl0ut further proof in all)' 
18 bankruptcy case or subsequent civil litigation pursued by the FTC to enforce its 
19 rights to any payment or money judgment pursuant to tIlis Order, including but not 
20 limited to a nondischargeability complaint in any bankruptcy case. Defendant 
21 Bernadette Perry further stipulates and agrees tIlat the facts alleged in the Complaint 
'),., establish all elements necessary to sustain an action by the FTC pursuant to, and that 
23 this Order shall have collateral estoppel etlect for purposes of Section 523(a)(2)(A) 
24 of the Banlmlptcy Code, 11 V.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A). This subsection is not intended 
25 to be, nor shall it be, construed as an achnission of liability by Defendant Bernadette 
26 Perry \vith respect to the allegations set forth in the Complaint with respect to any 
27 claims or demands by any third parties. 
28 
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1 C. Defendant Bemadette Perry stipulates and agrees that the judgm ent 
2 ordered by this Section is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, pursuant to Section 523 
3 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.c. § 523~ 
4 D. The judgment entered pursuant to this Section is equitable monetary 
5 reliet~ solely remedial in nature, and not a fine, penalty, punitive assessment or 
6 forfeiture; 
7 E. Upon request, Defendant Bemadette Perry is hereby required, in 
8 accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 7701, to fl1nlish to the FTC any tax identification 
9 mUll bers, \vhich shall be used for purposes of collecting and reporting on any 
10 delinquent am OlUlt arising out of this Order; and 
11 F. Upon request, Defendant Bernadette Perry is hereby required to fl1nlish 
12 to the FTC with copies of any tax retlID1S submitted for the years 2004 through the 
13 present; and 
14 G. Pursuant to Section 604(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 
15 § 1681 b(1), any consumer reporting agency may furnish a C0J1,)1U11 er report 
16 concerning Defendant Benladette Perry to the FTC, which shall be used for purposes 
17 of collecting and reporting on any delinquent am OlUlt arising out of this Order. 
18 RIGHT TO REOPEN 
19 VI. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, the FTC's agreement to, and the Court's 
20 approval o( tIus Order is expressly premised on the truthfulness, accuracy and 
21 completeness of the revised financial statement submitted to FTC cOlll1sel by 
22 Defendant Benmdette Perry on April 8, 2010 and the swom testimony given by 
23 Defendant Benladette Perry on or about December 11, 2009. I( upon motion by the 
24 FTC, the Court finds that: (1) the financial statement or sworn testimony of 
25 Defendant Benladette Perry contain any material misrepresent.'ltion or omission, or 
26 (2) Defendant Bemadette Perry receives any money or assets owed to her as of the 
27 date of entry of this Order by any Defendant named in tIus civil action, or their 
28 
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1 otlicers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons and entities in active concert or 
2 participation with them, including pursuant to any chose of action to recover money 
3 or assets from such persons, the suspended judgm ent entered in Section V of this 
4 Order shall become immediately due and payable. Providecl, howevel; in all other 
5 respects this Order shall remain in full force and effect unless othenvise ordered by 
6 the Court; and, providedjllrther, that proceedings instituted tmder this provision 
7 \vould be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other civil or criminal remedies as 
8 may be provided by law, including any other proceedings that the FTC may initiate 
9 to enforce this Order. For purposes of this Section, Defendant Bernadette Perry 
10 waives any right to contest any of the allegations in the Complaint. 
11 COOPER4.TION \VITH FTC 
12 VII. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bernadette Perry shall, in 
13 cOlmection with tlus action or any subsequent investigation or litigation related to or 
14 associated \vith the transactions or tlle occurrences tllat are tlle subject of the 
15 Complaint, cooperate in good faith with the FTC and appear at such places and times 
16 as the FTC shall reasonably request, after \vritten notice, for interviews, conferences, 
17 pretrial discovery, review of documents, and for such otller matters as may be 
18 reasonably requested by tlle FTC. If requested in writing by the FTC, Defendant 
19 Bemadette Perry shall appear and provide tmthful testimony in any trial, deposition, 
20 or other proceeding related to or associated with the transactions or the occurrences 
21 that are the subject of the Complaint, without the service of a subpoena, proVided, 
22 h01Fevel~ tlmt Defendant Bemadette Perry shall be entitled to receive any witness 
23 fees and expenses allowable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 
24 COMPLL4NCE l\·10NITORING 
25 VIII. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of (i) mOlutoring and 




B:09-cv-00BOO-OOC-AN Oocumen~,1,1~0,~ Filed 07/14/10 Page 14 of20 Page 10 I 
tF:I~4L 
1 accuracy of Defendant Bernadette Perry's financial statement or sworn testimony 
") upon 'which the FTC's agreement to this Order is expressly premised: 
3 A. \Vithin ten (10) days of receipt of written notice from a representative of 
4 the FTC, Defendant Bemadette Perry shall submit additional \vritten reports, "vhich 
5 are true and accurate and sworn to lUlder penalty of perjury; produce doclUllents for 
6 inspection and copying; appear for deposition; and provide entry during normal 
7 business hours to any business location in Defendant Bernadette Perry's possession 
8 or direct or mdirect control to inspect the business operation; 
9 B. In addition, the FTC is authorized to use all other lawful means, 
10 including but not limited to: 
11 1. obtaming discovery from any person, without further leave of 
12 court, using the procedures prescribed by FecI. R. Civ. P. 30,31, 33, 34, 36, 45 and 
13 69; 
14 posing as consum ers and suppliers to Defendant Bernadette 
15 Perry, her employees, or any other entity managed or controlled in whole or in part 
16 by Defendant Bemadette Perry, without the necessity of identification or prior 
17 notice;and 
18 C. Defendant Benladette Perry shall permit representatives of the FTC to 
19 intervie\v any employer, consultant, independent contractor, representative, agent, or 
20 employee who has agreed to such an interview, relating in any \vay to any conduct 
21 subject to this Order. The person interviewed may have cOlUlsel present. 
22 D. Provi(/ed hOlvever, that nothing in this Order shall limit the FTC's 
23 lawful use of compulsory process, pursuant to Sections 9 and 20 of the FTC Act, 15 
24 U.S.c. §§ 49, 57b-l, to obtain any doclUllentary material, tangible things, testimony, 
25 or information relevant to lUlfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
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1 CO]\tIPLIANCE REPORTING 
2 IX. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in order that compliance with the 
3 provisions oftlus Order may be monitored: 
4 A. For a period of seven (7) years from the date of entry of this Order, 
5 1. Defendant Benladette Perry shall notify the FTC of the following: 
6 a. Any changes in her residence, mailing addresses, and 
7 telephone numbers, within ten (10) days of the date of such change; 
8 b. i\11Y changes in her employment status (including self-
9 employment), and any change in her ownership in any business entity, vvithin ten 
10 (10) days of the date of such change. Such notice shall include the name and address 
11 of each business that she is affiliated \Vitll, employed by, creates or forms, or 
12 perfonns services for~ a detailed description of the nature of the business; and a 
13 detailed description of her duties and responsibilities in cOlmection with the business 
14 or employment; and 
15 c. Any changes in her nam e or use of any aliases or fictitious 
16 names; 
17 2. Defendant Bernadette Perry shall notifY the FTC of any changes 
18 in structure of any Corporate Defendant or any business entity that she directly or 
19 indirectly controls, or has an ownership interest in, that may affect compliance 
20 obligations arising under this Order, including but not limited to: incorporation or 
21 other organization; a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action; the 
22 creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or 
23 practices subject to this Order; or a chcUlge in the business name or address, at least 
24 thirty (30) days prior to such change, provided that, with respect to any proposed 
25 change in the business entity about which Defendant Bernadette Perry learns less 
26 than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, she shall notify the 
27 FTC as soon as is practicable after obtauung such knowledge. 
28 
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B. One htmdred eighty (180) days after the date of entry of this Order and 
2 annually thereafter for a period of seven (7) years, Defendant Bernadette Perry shall 
3 provide a \vritten report to the FTC, which is tme and accurate and swom to tmder 
4 penalty of perjury, setting forth in detail the mmmer and form in which she has 
5 complied and is complying with this Order. This report shall include, but not be 
6 limited to: 
7 1. Defendant Benladette Perry's then-current residence address, 
8 mailing addresses, and telephone 11lullbers; 
9 2. Defendant Bemadette Perry's then-current employment status 
10 (including self-employment), including the name, adclres.'3es, and telephone mUllbers 
11 of each business that she is affiliated with, employed by, or perfonns services for; a 
12 detailed description of the nature of the business; and a detailed description of her 
13 duties and responsibilities in connection with the business or employment; and 
14 3. A copy of each acknowledgment of receipt of this Order, 
15 obtained pursuant to the Section titled "Distribution of Order:" and 
16 4. i~.ny other changes required to be reported under Subsection A of 
17 this Section. 
18 C. Defendant Benladette Perry shall notifY the FTC of the filing of a 
19 bl:mkruptcy petition by her within fifteen (15) days of filing. 
20 D. F or the purposes of this Order, Defendant Bernadette Perry shall, tmless 
21 otherwise directed by the FTC's authorized representatives, send by ovenlight 
22 courier all reports and notifications required by this Order to the FTC, to the 





Associate Director for Enforcem ent 
Bureau of ConStU11er Protection 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.\V. 
\VashingtOn, D.C. 20580 
RE: FTc v. Loss Afitigation Services, Inc., Case No. SACV09-
800 DOC (ANx) (C.D. Ca.) 
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1 Provided that, in lieu of ovemight courier, Defendant Bemadette Perry may send 
2 such reports or notifications by first-class mail, but only if she contemporaneously 
3 sends an electronic version of such report or notification to the FTC at: 
4 DEBrief@!1ftc.gov. 
5 E. F or purposes of the compliance reporting and monitoring required by 
6 this Order, the FTC is authorized to c0l111ntmicate directly with Defendant Bemadette 
7 Perry. 
8 RECORD KEEPING PROVISIONS 
9 x. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of ten (10) years from the 
Iodate of entry of this Order, in cOlmection vvith any business \vhere Defendant 
11 Bemadette Perry is the majority owner of the business or directly or indirectly 
12 manages or controls the business, Defendant Benladette Perry and her agent<.:, 
13 employees, officers, corporations, and those persons in active concert or participation 
14 with him who receive actual notice of this Order by personal service or othenvise, 
15 are hereby restrained and enjoined from failing to create and retain the following 
16 records: 
17 A. AccOlmting records that reflect the cost of goods or services sold, 
18 revenues generated, and the disbursement of such revenues; 
19 B. Personnel records accurately renecting: the name, address, and 
20 telephone munber of each person employed in any capacity by such business, 
21 including as an independent contractor~ that person's job title or position~ the date 
22 upon vvhich the person commenced work; and the date and reason for the person's 
23 termination, if applicable~ 
24 c. Customer files containing the names, addresses, phone numbers, dollar 
25 amounts paid, quantity of items or services purchased, and description of items or 
26 services purchased, to the extent such information is obtained in the ordinary course 
27 of business; 
28 
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1 D. Complaints and reflmd requests (\vhether received directly, indirectly, 
2 or through any third party) and any responses to those complainte;; or requeste;;; 
3 E. Copies of all sales scripts, training materials, advertisements, or other 
4 marketing materials; and 
5 F. All records and documents necessary to demonstrate full compliance 
6 with each provision of this Order, including but not limited to, copies of 
7 acknowledgments of receipt of this Order required by the Sections titled 
8 "Distribution of Order" and "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order" and all reports 
9 submitted to the FTC pursuant to the Section titled "Compliance Reporting." 
10 DISTRIBUTION OF ORDER 
11 XI. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period of four (4) years from the 
12 date of entry of this Order, Defendant Bemadette Perry shall deliver copies of tlns 
13 Order as directed below: 
14 A Defendant Bemadette Perry as Control Person: For any business that 
15 Defendant Bemadette Perry controLe;;, directly or indirectly, or in wInch Defendant 
16 Bemadette Perry has a majority ownerslnp interest, Defendant Benladette Perry must 
17 deliver a copy of this Order to (l) all principals, otTicers, directors, and managers of 
18 that business; (2) all employees, agente;;, and representatives of that blLe;;iness who 
19 engage in conduct related to the subject matter of Section I of tIns Order (entitled 
20 Ban on Mortgage Loan lYfodification and Forecloslrre Relief Services) or Section II 
21 of this Order (entitled Prolnbited Representations Relating to Financial Related 
")") Goods and Services); and (3) any business entity resulting from any change in 
23 stnlCture set forth in Subsection A.2 of the Section titled "Compliance Reporting." 
24 For current persolU1el, delivery shall be \vithin five (5) days of service Oftllis Order 
25 upon Defendant Benladette Perry. For ne\v personnel, delivery shall occur prior to 
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1 change in stmcture set forth in Subsection A.2 of the Section titled "Compliance 
2 Reporting," delivery shall be at least ten (10) days prior to the change in stmcture. 
3 B. Defendant Bemadette Perry as Employee or Non-Control Person: For 
4 any business ,vhere Defendant Bemadette Perry is not a controlling person of a 
5 business but otherwise engages in conduct related to the subject matter of Section I 
6 of this Order (entitled Ban on l'vfortgage Loan lvlodification and Foreclosure Relief 
7 Services) or Section II of this Order (entitled Prohibited Representations Relating to 
8 Financial Related Goods and Services), Defendant Bemadette Perry must deliver a 
9 copy of this Order to all principals and managers of such business before engaging in 
10 such conduct. 
11 C. Defendant Bemadette Perry must secure a signed and dated statement 
12 acknowledging receipt of this Order, within thirty (30) days of delivery, from all 
13 persons receiving a copy of this Order pursuant to this Section. 
14 ACKNO\VLEDGl\fENT OF RECEIPT OF ORDER 
15 XII. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bernadette Perry, within five 
16 (5) business days of receipt of this Order as entered by the Court, must submit to the 















B:09-cv-00BOO-DOC-AN Document 110 Filed 07114/10 Page 20 of 20 Page ID I 
1948 
RETENTION OF JURI&DICTION 
3 XIII. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of tllis 
























IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of July, 2010. 
UNIIED STALES DISIRICI JODGE 
David O. Carter 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No.8: 08-cv-01735-VMC-TBM 
FEDERAL TR.4..DE CO!vIlVIISSION, ) 
) 




UNITED HOME SAVERS, LLP, ) 
~l Florid~l limited liability partnership, ) 
) 
STEPHANIE DIETSCHY, ) 
individually and ~lS a partner, officer and/or ) 
manager of United Home Savers, and ) 
) 
DARIN DIETSCHY, ) 
individually and as a partner, officer and/or ) 
manager of Uuited Home Savers, ) 
) 
Defemhlllts. ) 
STIPULATED PERlVIANENT INJUNCTION AND FINAL JUDGIvlENT 
This matter comes before the COUli on the complaint ofPlaintifl: Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"), against Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, 
Stephanie Dietsc11Y, and Dalln Dietschy. 011 September 3,2008, the Commission filed a 
Complaint for It~junctive and Other Equitable Reliefiu this matter pm-suant to SectiOlls 5(a) 
and 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.c. §§ 45(a) and 53(b). 
The COlUmission charged Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietsc1ty, and 
Dalln Dietschy Wit11 engaging in deceptive acts or practices in cOllnection with the marketing 
and sale of mortgage foreclosure rescne services, in violation of Section 5(a) oftlle FTC Act, 
15 U.S.c. § 45(a). The COlUmission and Defendants have agreed to settle all matters of 
8:08-cv-01735-VMC-AEP Document 31 Filed 08/19/2009 Page 2 of 23 
dispute between them without adjudication, Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
FINDINGS 
1. TIns Comt has jmlsdictioll ofthe subject matter oftlris case and the pmties 
hereto pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), 1345, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 53(b). 
2. Venue in the Ivfiddle Dishict of Florida IS proper as to all patties, 
3. The activities of DefEmdants U1lited Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, 
and Darin Dietschy are in or atlectillg COlllmerce, as defined in the FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. § 44. 
4. The complaint states a claim upon which reliefmay be granted against 
Defendants lhnted Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, and Dmln Dietschy mlder 
Sections 5(a) and 13(b) ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 45(a) and 53(b). 
5, DefEmdants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, and Darin 
Dietschy lvaive all lights to seek judicial review or otl1envlse challenge or contest the 
validity of tIns Final Order. 
6. Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, and Dmin 
Dietschy fmther 'waive any claim, including any claim for attomeys' fees under tIle Equal 
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, alllellde~l by Pub. L. 104-121,110 Stat. 847, 863-64 
(1996), and any c1a.itns they may have against Ule COlllmission, its employees, 
representatives, or agents. 
7. Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, and Dmin 
Dietschy enter Into this Stipulated Penn anent Injunction and Final Judgment ("Final Order') 
-2-
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freely and without coercion and ac1movvledge that they have read, lUlderstalld, and are 
prepared to abide by the provisions of this Final Order. 
8. This Final Order is in addition to, and not in lieu ot: any other civil or 
criminal remedies that may be provided by law. 
9. EnlIy of tlus Final Order is in the public interest. 
DEFINITIONS 
For the pUlpose oftlus Final Order, the following defuutions shall apply: 
1. "Assisting others" means knowingly providing any of the following goods or 
services to anotller business venture: (A) perfonnillg customer service fiUlctiOlls, including, 
but not limited to, receiving or responding to consumer complaints; (B) t011lmlating or 
providing, or arranging for the fonnulation or provision of, any marketing material; (C) 
pwvidillg names ot: or assisting in the generation of, potential customers; (D) Juring, 
recnritillg, or training persollnel; (E) advising or acting as a consultant to otllers on the 
commencement or management of a business venture; or (F) pertonning marketing services 
of any kind. 
"COlporate Detendant" 1l1emlS Uluted Home Savers, LLP, and its successors 
and assigns. 
3. "Individual Detendants" meaIlS Stephmue Dietschy and Darin Dietschy. 
4. "Defendants" means all ofthe Individual Defemlmlts and the COl]Jorate 
Defendant, individually, collectively, or in any combination. 
5. "'Document" means wIltings, (h'awings, graphs, charts, photograph .. :;:, 
-3-
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sotUld recordings, images, and any otlier data or data compilations :siored in any medimll 
from which infonnatioll can be obtained and translated, if llecessmy, into reasonably usable 
fonn ~Uld is synonymous in meaning and equal in scope to the usage ofthe tenn in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34(a), A eh'aft or non-identical copy ofa docmnent is a 
separate document witlun the meaning ofthe tenn, 
6, "l'vfoligage toreclosure rescue service" means any service, product, or 
program wherein the ofteror, expressly or by implication, claims that it can assist a 
homeowner in any manner to (A) stop, prevent, or postpone any home 11l0ligage toreclosure 
sale, (B) obtain any torbearance ii-om any benefici31Y or mortgagee, (C) exercise any 
statutory right ofreill&iatement, (D) obtain any extension ofthe peiiod witlun \vluch the 
O\vner may reinstate Ius or her obligation, (E) obtain any waiver of an acceleration clause 
contained in any pronussOlY note or contract secured by a deed oft11lst or mortgage 011 a 
residence in toreclosure or contained in that deed oftrust or llloligage, (F) obtain a loan or 
advance offiUlds, (G) avoid or repair any credit impainnent re:S'1uting fi:om 1ll0ligage default 
or foreclosure sale, (H) save the owner's residence tl-om foreclosure, or (1) assist the O"Vltef 
in obtanung any remailung proceecb fi.-om the foreclosure sale oftlte ovmer's residence. The 
foregoing shall include any manner of claimed assistance, including, but not limited to, debt, 
budget, or financial cOlUlseling; Teceiving money for the pUlpose of distIibnting it to 
creditors; contacting creditors 011 behalf of tIle homeowner; anangillg or attempting to 
anallge for an extension ofthe peliod WitlUll wluch the owner of property sold at foreclosure 
may cm'e Ius or ller det1nut; anallgillg or attemptnlg to anange for any delay or postponement 
-4-
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of the time of a f()feclosme sale; and giving advice of any kind with respect to filing for 
bankmptcy. 
"7 
I. The tenn "and" also llleans "or," and the tel111 "or" also means "and." 
ORDER 
I. PROHIBITED BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie Dietschy, 
and Darin Dietschy, and their snccessors, assigns, agents, employees, officers, servants, <mel 
all otller persons or entities in active conceIt or pmticipatioll with them ·who receive actual 
notice oftlns Final Order by personal service, f11csimile, or otherwise, whether acting directly 
or through any cOl1)oration, subsidiary, division or otller device, are hereby permanently 
restrained and el~ oined fl:om: 
A. Falsely representing, or assisting others to £"11sely represent, expressly 
or by implication, allY matellal fact in connection with tlle advertiSIng, marketing, promoting, 
offeling for sale, or sale of any 1ll0ltgage foreclosme rescne service, including but 110t liunted 
to llnsrepresellting: 
(1) tltat any home llloligage foreclosure can or ·will be stopped, postponed, 
or prevented~ 
an ability to help all COllSlUllers, regarcliess oftheir individual 
circulllstances or situations; 
(3) the likelihood that home moligage foreclosure can or ,vill be stopped, 
postponed, or prevented; 
-5-
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(4) the degree of past success of any efforts to stop, postpone, 
or prevent home mortgage foreclosures; 
(5) tlte Hum ber of satisfied customers or customer complaints; 
(6) the ten11S of any refillld or guarantee; 
(7) the likelihood that a COllSlUner \vill receive a fiill or partial refund if a 
home 1Uoligage foreclosure is not stopped, postponed, or prevented; 
(8) any approval, endorsement, or rating by the Better Business Bureau or 
any other consumer advocacy or consumer protection association; or 
(9) any fact matelial to a COllSUluer's decision to purchase any 
mortgage foreclosure rescue se1yice, 
B. Falsely representing, or assisting others to falsely represent, expressly 
or by implication, any 111ate1ial fact in connection \vith the adve1using, marketing, promoting, 
off€ning for sale, sale, or dishibution of any other good or service, 
II. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DISTRIBUTION OF CUSTOMER INFORMATION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants United Home Savers, LLP, Stephanie 
Dietschy, and Dmin Dietschy, and their successors, assigns, agents, employees, officers, 
se1vants, and all other persons or entities in active concert or participation with them \\'ho 
receive actual notice offhis Final Order by personal service, facsimile, or otherwise, whether 
acting directly or through any cOl}Joratioll, snbsiclialY, division or other device, are 
pennanelltly restTained mId enjoined fi.-om selling, renting, leasing, transfenillg or otherwise 
disclosing tlle incli"vidualnmne, address, telephone number, email adch'ess, credit carel 
-6-
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munber, social secmity number, bank accOlUlt number or otller identifYing infoll11ation of 
any person who provided any such infolluatioll to Defendants at any time in connection with 
the advertising, marketing, promoting, ottering f'Or sale, or sale Ofl1l0ligage f'Oreclosme 
rescue selvices; provider!, li01rever, tllat Defendants may disclose such identifYing 
illf(mnation to any law enforcem ent or regulatory agency, or as required by any la,\, , 
regulation or comt order. 
III. MONETARY .JUDGI\1ENT AND CONSUlVIER REDRESS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tlmt: 
A. Judgment is hereby entered ill f~Tvor ofthe Commission [mel against 
Dei€mdmlts, United Home Savers, LLP, Sfephmrie Dietschy, and Darin Dietschy, jointly mld 
severally, in the amount of$4,1 00,000 f'Or the payment of eqlritable lllonetmy relief-
including, but not limited to, rech'ess of COllSlUll er injmy mIdi or clisgorgement, and f'Or paying 
any attendant expenses of achnuristration of any rech-ess fund. 
B. Except as provided in Section IV oftlris Final Order, the judgment 
shall be suspended upon payment of$ 21,694.22: Upon entry oftIris Final Order, Defendants 
thrited Home Savers, LLP, Stephmrie Dietschy, and Darin Dietschy, mld Plaintiff'will 
stipulate to transfer $16,297.64ul fimds held in :rdercantile Bank account ending 7813~ 
$5290.61 in fi1llds held Ul Mercantile Bank accoullt ending 0147; $50.00 in fi1llds held in 
1'vIercmltile Bank aCC011llt ending 0422; $ 52.94ul filllds held in Wachovia Bank account 
endillg 3954; mHl $3.03 ill filllds held in Old Harbor Bank account ending Ul 3116, all of 
wIrich were fiozen pmi','uant to the Temporm), Restrauring Order, entered by the Comt on 
..., 
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September 4,2008, and the Stipulated Preliminmy Il~jUllCtiOll, entered by the Comt on 
September 12, :::W08. The Def€.'1ldallts shall pay all amOlmts due to the C0111111ission in cash 
by electronic fimcls transfer to the Commission, or to such agent as the Commission may 
direct, pmsuallt to inst111ctions provided by the Commission. 
C. Funds paid over to the Commission pursuant to tIus Section shall be deposited 
into a fi11ld administered by the Commission or its designated representative to be used fer 
equitable relief: including, but not limited to, redress for consumer il~jl11Y and any attendant 
expenses for tIle acbnilustration of any rech"ess fimd. Defendants lvill cooperate fillly to assist 
the COlll11ussion in identi:t}'.ing consnmers who may be entitled to redress pursuant to this 
FinalOrder. In tIle event tlwt direct rerh'ess to consumers is wholly or pmtially impracticable 
or funds remain after rech'ess is completed, the Commission may apply fimc1s for any other 
equitable relief (induding consmuer infellllation remedies) that it detenllines to be 
reasonably related to Defendants' practices alleged in the complaint. A.ny fimds 110t used fer 
tlus equitable relief shall be deposited into the U.S. TreasUlY as disgorgement. Defendants 
shall have no right to challenge the COlllmission's choice of remedies lmder tIus Section. 
D. Defendants relinquish all domiluon, contTol, and title to tIle fimds paid 
to tIle filliest extent penllitted by Imv. Defendants shall make 110 claim to or demand fer 
rehllll ofthe fimds, directly or indirectly, tIuough cOlmsel or othenvise. 
E. DefenchUlts agree that the facts as alleged in the complaint filed III tlus 
action shall be tal.;:en as tme without fiu't1ler proofin any bankmptcy case or subsequent civil 
litigation pmsuecl by the Commission to enforce its rights to any payment or money 
-8-
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judgment pursuant to tIus Final Order, incl ueling but not limited to a llondischargeability 
complaint in any bankruptcy case. Defendants filliher stipulate and agree that the facts 
alleged in the Complaint establish all elements necessmy to sm,tain an action pursuant to, and 
that tlus Final Order shall have collateral estoppel etIect for pUl])OSeS ot: Section 
523(a)(2)(A) ofthe Bankrnptcy Code, 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
F. DefellcitUlts acknowledge and agree that the judgment entered 
pursuant to tIus Section is equitable 11l0netmy rehet: solely remedial in nature, and is not a 
fine, penalty, pUlutive assessment, or forfeiture. 
G. Detendants are hereby required, in accordance \vith 31 U.S.c. § 7701, 
to fil11ush to tIle Commission Detendants' ta.xpayer identifYing numbers (social security 
number or employer identificationlUullber), wIuch shall be used for pUll)oses of collecting 
and repOliing on allY delinquent alllOlUlt miring out of Detendants, relatiollslup with the 
g OVe11l111 ent. 
IV. RIGHT TO REOPEN AS TO IVIONETARY JUDGIVIENT 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
A. By agreeing to tlus Final Order, Defendants reaffinl1 and attest to the 
trntIlfillness, accuracy, and completeness of De fencl ants' ,vIltten Financial Statements dated 
APlll16 and 21, 2009, and ofthe illtonuatioll provided in tIle Defendants' depositions of 
APll16, 2009. TIus COUlt'S Final Order, and the Plaintiff's agreement to enter into this Final 
Order, is expressly premised upon the truthfilhless, accmacy, and completeness of 
DefendcUlts' financial conditions, as represented in the Financial Statements referenced 
-9-
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above, which contai1l1l1atelial illfonnatioll upon which the COlllmission relied inllegotiating 
and agreeing to the tenns oftlris Final Order. 
B. If, upon motion by plaintift: tlris Comt should find that one or more 
Defendant £'1ilecl to disclose any matelial asset, or matelially misrepresented the value of any 
asset or made any other matelial misrepresentation in or omission fi'om t1le Financial 
Statements, the Comt shall reinstate the suspended jUdgment against such Deiendant, in 
favor of the Commissioll, in the amount of $4, 100,000, ,,,Irich the DefenchUlts and the 
Commission stipulate is the amolUlt of consmner il~jU1y jointly and severally caused by the 
dei€mdallts, less any payments made to the COlllmission, plus interest fi'om the entIy date of 
tlris Final Order, pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1961. Providecl, however, that in all otller respects, 
tlris Final Order shall remain in full force and effect unless oUlenvise ordered by the Coml. 
V. COMPLIANCE l\fONITORING 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purposes of (i) 1ll00ritOlillg and 
investigating compliance \",ith any provision of Uris Final Order, and (ii) investigating the 
accmacy of allY Deiendant's [maneial statements Ul)Oll wIrich the Commission's agreement 
to tIris Final Order is expressly premised: 
A. \"Vitlrin ten (10) days of receipt of \V1ittell11otice fi'om a representative 
of the COllUlrission, Deiendants each shall submit additional 'Vlitten repoIis, ,vIrich are tme 
and accurate and SW0111 to under penalty ofpel:jury; produce doclUuents for inspection and 
copying; appear for deposition; and provide enhy dlUing nonnal business hours to any 
business location in each Defendant's possession or direct or indirect control to inspect the 
-10-
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business operation. 
B. In addition, the Commission is authOlizecl to use all otiler ImvfiJlmeans, 
including but not limited to: 
1. Obtaining discovery fi.-om any perSOll, without fmther leave of comt, 
using the procedmes prescribed by Fed. R Civ. P. 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 
45, and 69; and 
2. Having its representatives pose as consumers and suppliers to 
Defendants, Defendants' employees, or any other entity managed or 
controlled in \vhole or in pmt by any Defendant, 'without tl1e necessity 
of identification or prior notice. 
C Defendants each shall penuit representatives ofthe Commission to il1tervie\v 
any employer, consultant, independent contractor, representative, agent, or employee ",-110 
has agreed to such an intervie,v, relating in any \vay to any conduct subject to tiris Final 
Order. The person illtervie,ved may have COlUlsel present. 
Providecl, however, tilat llotiring in tilis Fillal Order shall limit the Commission's 
lawful use of compulsory process, pmsuant to Sections 9 and 20 ofthe FTC Act, 15 U.S.C 
§§ 49, 57b-l, to obtain any documentary matelial, tangible things, testimony, or infonuation 
relevant to unfair 01 deceptive acts or practices in or affecting C01llmerce (witlrin the memring 
of1S U.S.C § 45(a)(I». 
VI. COlVIPLIANCE REPORTING BY DEFENDANTS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in order that complimlce with the provisions of 
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this Final Order may be monitored: 
A. For a period of five (5) years fl:om the date of ently ofthis Final Order, 
1. Each Individual Defendant shallnotiiJ the Commission of the 
following: 
a. Any changes in such DetEmdant's residence, mailing adch'esses, 
and telephone munbers, within ten (10) days of the date of such 
change; 
b. A,11Y changes in such Defendant's employment status 
(including self-employment), and any change in such 
Defendant's o\vnel'ship in any business entity (except a 
publicly traded company ill1,vhich such Defendant's o\vnerslrip 
interest totals less than 1 %), witlrin ten (10) days oftIle date of 
such change, Such notice shall include tIle name and adch'ess 
of each business that such Defendant is affiliated 1,vitll, 
employed by, creates or t01111S, or perfol1ns services tor; a 
detailed description of the natme oftlle business; and a detailed 
description of such Defendant's duties and responsibilities in 
connection with the business or employment; and 
c. Any changes ill such Defendant's name or use of any aliases or 
tictitious names witlrin ten (10) days of the date of such 
change; 
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2. Defendants shall notify the COlllluission of any changes in stmctme of 
COlporate Defendant or any business entity that any Defendant 
directly or indirectly contI"ols, or has an o\vllership interest in, that may 
affect compliance obligations arising under tIris Final Order, including 
but not liurited to: incolporation or other organizatioll~ a dissolution, 
assigmnellt, sale, merger, or other action; the creation or dissolution of 
a subsidiary, parent, or aftlliate that engages in any acts or practices 
subj ect to tlris Final Order; or a change in the business name or 
adch-ess, at least tlriIty (30) clays prior to such change, provided tllat, 
witll respect to any such change in the business entity about ,,,Irich a 
Defendant learns less than tlridy (30) days pilor to tlle date such action 
is to take place, such Defendant shall notifY the Commission as soon 
as is practicable after obtailring such knowledge. 
B. Sixty (60) days after tlle date ofelltly ofthis Final Order and anllually 
thereafter for a peliod of five (5) years, Defendants each shall provide a wlitten repOlt to the 
FTC, wIrich is tme and accurate and sworn to lUlder penalty of peljury, setting forth in detail 
the manner amI f011n in 'which they have complied and are complying \vitb tlris Final Order. 
TIns repOlt shall include, but not be limited to: 
1. For each Individual Defendant: 
a. such Defendant's tllen-CUlTent residence address, mailing 
addresses, and telephone lllunbers; 
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b. such Defendant's thell-clUTellt employment statns (including 
self-emplo}1uent), including the name, addJ.-esses, and 
telephone Hum bers of each business that such Defendant is 
affiliated ldth, employed by, or perfonns services for; a 
detailed description ofthe nahne ofthe business; and a detailed 
descliptioll OfS11C11 DetEmdant's duties and responsibilities in 
cOlUlection with the business or employment; and 
c. }\ny other changes required to be reported muler Subsection A 
oftlris Section. 
2. For all Defendants: 
a. A copy of each acknowledgment of receipt oftIris Final Order, 
obtained plmmant to the Section titled "DistIibution of Order 
by Defendants'\ and 
b. }\ny other c11anges required to be reported under Subsection A 
oftlris Sectioll. 
C. Each DefEmclant shall notifY the COlllmission of the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition by such Det€mdallt witlrin fifteen (15) days oftiling. 
D. For the pml)oses oft1ris Final Order, Det€mdants shall, unless otherwise 
directed by the Commission's authOlized representatives, send by ovenright comier all 
repOlts and notifications reqlrired by t1ris Final Order to tlle Commission, to the follmving 
address: 
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Associate Director for Enforcement 
Federal Trade Commission 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.\V., Room NJ-2122 
Waslungton, D.C. 20580 
RE: FTC v. [inned Home Savers LLP eta/. 
Provided that, in lieu of ovenught cOUller, DetEmc1allts may send such reports or 
notitications by first-class mail, but only if DetEmdants contemporaneously send an electrOluc 
version of such repolt or notification to the Commission at: DEBliet;i-[!tlc.gov. 
E. For pUlposes ofthe compliance rep01tl.ng and 1ll0lutoring required by 
tlus Final Order, the Commission is auth01lzecl to commmucate directly with each 
Dettmdallt. 
VII. RECORDKEEPING PROVISIONS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a pellod of eight (8) years ii-om the date of 
enhy oftIus Final Order, Det'Emdants and those businesses where illly Defendant is the 
majolity owner or otherwise conh'ols the business and their agents, employees, officers, 
c01poratiOllS, and tllOse persons in active conceIt or pmticipatiolllVith them \vho receive 
actualllotice oftlus Final Order by personal service, filCsimile, or otherwise, ill connection 
\vith the advertising, marketing, promoting, offEnlng for sale, or sale Of1l101tgage tl1reclosme 
rescue services, are hereby resh'ained and el~ioilled fi'om tailing to create illid retain the 
tollowing records: 
A AccOllllting records that retlect the cost of goods or services sold, revenues 
generated, and tlle disbursement of such revenues; 
B. Personnel records accurately retlecting: the name, address, illlcl telephone 
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mUll ber of each person employed in ~Uly capacity by such business, including as an 
independent contractor; that person's job titIe or position; the date upon "vInch the person 
commenced ·work; and tile date and reason for the person's telluillation, if applicable; 
C. Customer files contaunng tIle names, ad(h'esses, phone 1l1uubers, dollar 
amounts paid, qumltity of items or selvices purchased, and description ofitems or services 
purchased, to the extent such infoll11ation is obtained in the OrdUlalY course ofbuslness; 
D. Complaints and refillld requests (whetller received directly or indirectly, such 
as tlu'ough a tlnrd party) and any responses to those complaints or requests; 
E. Copies of all sales sClipts, trainulg matelials, advertisements, or other 
marketulg matelials; and 
F. All records mld docluuents necessary to demonstrate fiill complimlce witIl 
each provision of tlns Final Order, including but not liunted to, copies of acknowledgments 
of receipt of tIns Fum! Order reqlnred by the Sections titled "Dishibution ofOrcler by 
Defendmlts" and "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order by Det"€mdallts" and all rep ods 
submitted to tlw FTC pursuant to the Section titled "Compliance Reporting." 
VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF ORDER BY DEFENDANTS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for a period offive (5) years fi'om tlle date of 
enuy oftlris FUlal Order, Defendants shall deliver copies oftlle Fuml Order as directed 
belo~N: 
A. COlporate Defendant: The COlporate Def"€mdant must deliver a copy 
oftlns Final Order to (1) all of its principals, officers, directors, mid mmwgers; (2) all of its 
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employees, agents, and representatives who engage in conduct related to the subject matter 
ofthe Final Order; and (3) any business entity resulting fi-om any change in stl.1lctme set 
iCllih in Subsection A2 ofthe Section titled "Compliance Reporting." For C1UTent personnel, 
delivel), shall be 1vitlun five (5) days of service ofthis Final Order upon such Defendant. For 
new persollnel, delivel), shall occur plior to them assuming their responsibilities. For any 
business entity resulting fi-om any change in stl11cture set fOlih in Subsection A.2 ofthe 
Section titled "Compliance Reporting," delivery shall be at least ten (10) days prior to the 
change in structure. 
B. Individual Defendant as Control Person: For any business tlmt an 
Individual Defendant controls, directly or indirectly, or in wluch such Defendant has a 
maj01ity ownership interest, such Defendant must deliver a copy oftlris Final Order to (1) all 
ptincipals, oflicers, directors, and mmwgers oftltat business; (2) all employees, agents, mld 
representatives ofthat business \vho engage in conduct related to the subject matter ofthe 
Final Order; mlcl (3) any bwsiness entity resulting ii-om any change in structure set f01ih in 
Subsection A2 oftlle Section titled "Compliance Rep01iing." For CtUTent persOlUlel, 
delivel), shall be witlrin five (5) days of service of tlris Final Order upon such Defendant. For 
neyv personnel, delivery shall occur prior to them assuming their reSl)Ollsibilities. For fUty 
business entity resulting fiolll any change in stlllcture set fotih in Subsection A.2 oftlle 
Section titled "Compliance Repoding," delivel), shall be at least ten (IO) days plio!" to tlle 
chmlge ill stlllcture. 
C. Individual Detenclmlt as employee or non-control person: For mly 
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business where rul Individual Detendant is not a controlling person of a business but 
otherwise engages in conduct related to the subject matter ofthis Final Order, such 
Detendant must deliver a copy of tlus Final Order to all principals and managers of such 
business before engaging in such conduct 
D. Defendants must secure a signed and elated statement acknowledging 
receipt ofthe Final Order, witlull thirty (30) days of clelivelY, t1:0111 all persons receiving a 
copy ofthe Final Order pursuant to tlus Sectioll. 
IX. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF ORDER BY DEFENDANTS 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each Detendant, ;."iUun five (5) business days of 
receipt oftlus Final Order as entered by the Court, must submit to the COlllmission a tmthful 
SW0111 statement acknowledging receipt oftIus Final Order, in the t01111 of Attachments A 
and B. 
X. RETENTION OF .JURISDICTION 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Comt shall retainjUllsclictioll ofthis matter 
tor pUlJloses of constmctioll, modification and enforcement oftIus Final Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, tIus 19th day of August, 2009, at 6:00 p.m. 
-li~£!i'JiE!~O~1! 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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/s/ Stephanie Dietscbv 
United Home Savers, LLP 
By: Stephanie Dietschy 
President and P31iner of 
United Home Savers, LLP 
Is/ Stephanie Dietschv 
Stephanie Dietschy 
Individually and as Ofllcer and 
Pminer of United Home 
Savers, LLP 
lsi Darin Dietschv 
Darin Dietschy 
Individually and as Oflicer and 
Partner of United Home 
Savers, LLP 
